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In developing countries, identifying the poor for redistribution or social insurance is challenging because
the government lacks information about people’s incomes. This paper reports the results of a field
experiment conducted in 640 Indonesian villages that investigated two main approaches to solving
this problem: proxy-means tests, where a census of hard-to-hide assets is used to predict consumption,
and community-based targeting, where villagers rank everyone on a scale from richest to poorest.
When poverty is defined using per-capita expenditure and the common PPP$2 per day threshold, we
find that community-based targeting performs worse in identifying the poor than proxy-means tests,
particularly near the threshold. This worse performance does not appear to be due to elite capture.
Instead, communities appear to be using a different concept of poverty: the results of community-based
methods are more correlated with how individual community members rank each other and with villagers’
self-assessments of their own status than per-capita expenditure. Consistent with this, the community-based
methods result in higher satisfaction with beneficiary lists and the targeting process.
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Targeted social safety net programs have become an increasingly common tool used to address 
poverty (Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott, 2004). In developed countries, the selection of the 
beneficiaries for these programs (“targeting”) is frequently accomplished through means-testing: 
only those with incomes below a certain threshold are eligible. However, in developing 
countries, where most potential recipients work in the informal sector and lack verifiable records 
of their earnings, credibly implementing a conventional income-based means test is much more 
challenging. 
Consequently, in developing countries, there is an increased emphasis on targeting 
strategies that do not rely on directly observing incomes.  In particular, there are two such 
strategies: proxy means tests (PMTs) and community-based targeting. In a PMT, which has been 
used in the Mexican Progresa/Oportunidades and Colombian Familias en Acción programs, the 
government collects information on assets and demographic characteristics to create a “proxy” 
for household consumption or income, and this proxy is in turn used for targeting. In 
community-based methods, such as the Bangladesh Food-For-Education program (Galasso and 
Ravallion, 2005) and the Albanian Economic Support safety net program (Alderman, 2002), the 
government allows the community or some part of it (e.g. local leaders) to select the 
beneficiaries. Both methods aim to address the problem of unobservable incomes: in the PMTs, 
the presumption is that household assets and demographic characteristics are harder to conceal 
from government surveyors than income; in community-based targeting, the presumption is that 
wealth is harder to hide from ones’ neighbors than from the government.  
From the perspective of a central government choosing how to design a targeted transfer 
program, the choice between the two approaches is generally framed as a tradeoff between the 
better information that communities might have versus the risk of elite capture in the community 3 
process. By focusing on assets, the PMTs aim to capture the permanent component of 
consumption. In the process, however, they miss out on transitory or recent shocks. For example, 
a family might have fallen into poverty because one of its members has fallen ill and cannot 
work, but because the family has a large house, the PMT may still classify it as non-poor. 
Neighbors, on the other hand, might know the family’s true economic situation, either from 
spending time with them or by merely observing the way they live (e.g. the way they dress, what 
they buy).
1 If the community perceives that the PMT gets it wrong, political instability and a lack 
of legitimacy may ensue.
2  
However, while community targeting allows the use of better local information, it also 
opens up the possibility that targeting decisions may be based on a wide range of factors beyond 
poverty as defined by the government. This may be due to genuine disagreements about what 
“poverty” means: the utility function used by the central government to evaluate households 
might be based only on consumption (i.e., the government allocates transfers to maximize U
g=Σ 
λgi ui
g (c)), whereas the utility function used by local communities may include other factors, 
such as a household’s earning potential or its number of dependants (i.e., the community 
maximizes U
c= Σλciu
c i(c,X)). Or the weights may be different (λg ≠ λc). In general, it is possible 
that the community’s decision process actually results in outcomes that are closer to what the 
government really wants (which is to maximize Σ λgi ui (c) where ui (c) is the true utility function 
that the government does not observe) than the government could achieve by maximizing U
g. 
However, the community process could also favor friends and relatives of the villages elites (in 
which case, the outcome could be worse than either maximizing U
g or maximizing Σ λgi ui (c)).  
                                                 
1 Seabright (1996) makes the theoretical argument that greater local information is one of the advantages of the 
community methods. Alderman (2002) and Galasso and Ravallion (2005) provide empirical evidence that 
communities may have additional information beyond the PMTs. 
2 See, for example, “Data Penerima BLT di Semarang Membingungkan” (BLT Beneficiary List in Semarang 
Confuses)” Kompas (5/15/08), “Old data disrupts cash aid delivery,” Jakarta Post (9/6/08); “Poorest still waiting for 
cash aid,” Jakarta Post (6/24/08); “Thousands protest fuel plan, cash assistance,” Jakarta Post (5/22/08). 4 
Given the tradeoffs involved, which method works best is ultimately an empirical 
question. If elite capture of community targeting is empirically important, then the PMT could 
dominate community targeting either based on the government’s consumption-based metric or a 
more holistic welfare metric, since the PMT limits the opportunity for capture. If better local 
information is empirically important, then community targeting could dominate the PMT on both 
of these metrics. If a different local conception of welfare is empirically important, then the PMT 
may best match the government’s consumption-based metric, while community targeting may 
work best based on alternative welfare metrics.
3  
To investigate these tradeoffs, we conducted a field experiment in 640 villages in 
Indonesia in collaboration with the government. In each village, the government implemented a 
cash transfer program that sought to distribute 30,000 Rupiah (about $3) to households that fell 
below location-specific poverty lines. In a randomly selected one-third of the villages, the 
government conducted PMT to target the poor (“PMT Method”). In another third of these 
villages, once again chosen at random, it employed community-based targeting (“Community 
Method”). Specifically, the community members were asked to rank everyone from richest to 
poorest during a meeting, and this ranking determined eligibility. In the remaining villages, a 
hybrid of the two methods was used (“Hybrid Method”): communities engaged in the ranking 
exercise, and then the ranks were used to limit the universe of individuals whom the government 
would survey. Eligibility was then determined by conducting PMT on this limited list. This 
hybrid method aimed to utilize the communities’ knowledge, while at the same time using the 
                                                 
3 Existing evidence is summarized by Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2004), who conduct a meta-analysis of 111 
targeted anti-poverty programs in 47 countries, including 7 PMTs and 14 cases of community-based targeting. They 
find no difference in the performance of these two models, as measured by the fraction of total targeted resources 
that went to the bottom 40 percent. This may be due, in part, to the small sample sizes in these studies. Moreover, at 
least two sources of opposing bias may be present. First, the authors suggest that community targeting is often 
chosen when state capacity is limited and the community functions well together. In such places, the PMT would 
have fared worse had it been tried. Second, the authors suggest that many relatively small projects have used the 
community model, but fail to systematically report data. As such, the included examples of community-based 
targeting tend to be bigger and, potentially, better run than the average. These two types of biases in existing studies 
suggest that comparing PMT and community targeting in the same setting is an open empirical question. 5 
PMT as a check on potential elite capture. The total number of beneficiaries in each village was 
pre-determined and held constant all three treatment groups. 
We begin by evaluating the methods from the perspective of the central government. 
More specifically, we evaluate which method best targeted the poor according to the central 
government’s welfare function (i.e., consumption-based poverty) and which method produced 
the highest satisfaction with the beneficiary list.
4 To measure targeting accuracy, we conducted a 
baseline survey that collected per capita expenditure data from a set of households prior to the 
experiment and then defined a household as poor if it fell below the common PPP$2 per day 
cutoff. We find that both the community and hybrid methods perform worse than the PMT: in 
both methods, there was a 3 percentage point (10 percent) increase in mis-targeting rates relative 
to the PMT. However, the community-based strategies actually do as well (if not better) at 
finding the very poor – those with consumption below PPP$1 per day.  
Despite the worse targeting outcomes, the community methods resulted in higher 
satisfaction levels and greater legitimacy of the process along all dimensions that we considered. 
For example, community targeting resulted in 60 percent fewer complaints than the PMT, and 
there were many fewer reports of difficulties in distributing the actual funds in the community 
treatment villages. When asked ex-post about the targeting process, the community treatment 
villages suggested fewer modifications to the beneficiary list and reported being much more 
satisfied with the process. 
To understand why the community methods exhibit these differences from the PMT, we 
examine several explanations: elite capture, the role of community effort, local concepts of 
poverty beyond per-capita expenditure, and local information about poverty.  
To test for elite capture in the community treatment, we randomly divided the community 
                                                 
4 Note that the Indonesian government’s definition of poverty is based on the cost of a food and non-food bundle 
typical for the poor in attaining basic minimum needs. 6 
and hybrid villages so that, in half of these villages, everyone in the community was invited to 
participate in the ranking meeting, whereas in the other half, only the “elites” (i.e. local 
community leaders such as the sub-village head, teachers, religious leaders, etc.) were invited. In 
addition, we gathered data in the baseline survey on which households were related to the local 
elites. We find no evidence of elite capture. The mis-targeting rates were the same, regardless of 
whether only the elites attended the meeting. Moreover, we find no evidence that households that 
are related to the elites are more likely to receive funds in the community treatments relative to 
the PMT. In fact, we find the opposite: in the community treatments, elites and their relatives are 
much less likely to be put on the beneficiary list, regardless of their actual income levels. 
To examine the role of effort, we randomized the order in which households were 
considered at the meetings. This allows us to test whether the effectiveness of community 
targeting differs between those households that were ranked first (when the community members 
were still full of energy) and those ranked last (when fatigue may have set in). We find evidence 
that effort matters: at the start of the community meeting, targeting performance is better than in 
the PMT, but it worsens as the meeting proceeds.  
To examine the role of preferences and information, we created and studied alternative 
metrics of evaluating perceptions of poverty in our baseline survey. First, we asked every survey 
respondent to rank a set of randomly chosen villagers from rich to poor (“survey ranks”). 
Second, we asked the head of the sub-village to conduct the same exercise. Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, we asked each household we interviewed to subjectively assess its own 
welfare level. We find that the community treatment produces a ranking of villagers that is much 
more correlated with these three alternate metrics than the ranking produced by PMT. In other 
words, the community treatments moved the targeting outcomes away from a ranking based 7 
purely on per-capita consumption and towards the rankings one would obtain by polling different 
classes of villagers or by asking villagers to rate themselves. 
There are two ways of explaining these findings: either the community has less 
information about different household’s per-capita consumption than the PMT, or the 
community’s conception of poverty is different from that based solely on per-capita 
consumption. The evidence suggests that the latter theory is what is predominantly driving the 
results. First, the correlation of the self-assessments with the survey ranks is higher than the 
correlation of the self-assessments with per-capita consumption. Thus, in assessing their own 
poverty, individuals (who presumably have complete information about their own poverty) use a 
welfare metric that looks more like what community members use to assess each other than their 
own per-capita consumption. Second, the survey ranks from when community members rank 
each other contain information about those villagers’ per-capita consumption, even controlling 
for all variables in the PMT; i.e. the community has residual information about consumption 
beyond the PMT. Finally, when we investigate how the survey ranks differ from consumption, 
we find that communities place greater weight on factors that predict earnings capacity than 
would be implied simply by per-capita consumption. For example, conditional on actual per 
capita consumption levels, the communities consider widowed households poorer than the 
typical household. The fact that communities employ a different concept of poverty explains why 
community targeting performance might differ from the PMT, as well as why the community 
targeting might result in greater satisfaction levels.  
The paper proceeds as follows. We discuss the empirical design in Section II, and we 
describe the data in Section III. In Section IV, we compare how each of the main targeting 
methods fared in identifying the poor. Section V tests for evidence of elite capture, while Section 
VI aims to understand the role of effort. In Section VII, we test whether the community and the 8 
government have different maximands. Section VIII explores the differences in the community’s 
maximand in greater depth. Section IX concludes. 
II. Experimental Design and Data 
II.A. Setting 
This project occurred in Indonesia, which is home to one of the largest targeted cash transfer 
programs in the developing world, the Direct Cash Assistance (Bantuan Langsung Tunai, or 
BLT) program. Launched in 2005, the BLT program provides transfers of about US $10 per 
month to about 19.2 million households. The targeting in this program was accomplished 
through a combination of community-based methods and proxy-means tests. Specifically, 
Central Statistics Bureau (Badan Pusat Statistik, or BPS) enumerators met with village leaders to 
create a list of households who could potentially qualify for the program. The BPS enumerators 
then conducted an asset survey and a PMT only for the listed households.  
Targeting has been identified by policymakers as one of the key problems in the BLT 
program. Using the common PPP$2 per day poverty threshold, the World Bank estimates that 45 
percent of the funds were mis-targeted to non-poor households and 47 percent of the poor were 
excluded from the program in 2005-2006 (World Bank, 2006).
5 Perhaps more worrisome from 
the government’s perspective is the fact that citizens voiced substantial dissatisfaction with the 
beneficiary lists. Protests about mis-targeting led some village leaders to resign rather than 
defend the beneficiary lists to their constituents.
6 In fact, over 2,000 village officials refused to 
participate in the program for this reason.
7 The experiment reported in this paper was designed 
and conducted in collaboration with BPS to investigate the two primary targeting issues: 
                                                 
5 Targeting inaccuracy has been documented in many government anti-poverty programs that offer subsidized rice, 
basic commodities, health insurance, and scholarships for poor households. See, for example, Olken (2006); Daly 
and Fane (2002); Cameron (2002); and Conn, Duflo, Dupas, Kremer and Ozier (2008).   
6 See for example: “BLT Bisa Munculkan Konflik Baru” (BLT May Create New Conflicts), Kompas (5/17/08), and 
“Kepala Desa Trauma BLT” (A Village Head’s Trauma with BLT) Kompas (5/24/08).  
7 See for example: “Ribuan Perangkat Desa Tolak Salurkan BLT” (Thousands of Village Officials Refuse to 
Distribute BLT), Kompas 5/22/08 and “DPRD Indramayu Tolak BLT,” (Village Parliament of Indramayu Refuses 
BLT), Kompas, 5/24/08. 9 
improving targeting performance and increasing popular acceptance of the targeting results.  
II.B. Sample 
The sample for the experiment consists of 640 sub-villages spread across three Indonesian 
provinces: North Sumatra, South Sulawesi, and Central Java. The provinces were chosen to 
represent a broad spectrum of Indonesia’s diverse geography and ethnic makeup. Within these 
three provinces, we randomly selected a total of 640 villages, stratifying the sample to consist of 
approximately 30 percent urban and 70 percent rural locations.
8 For each village, we obtained a 
list of the smallest administrative unit within it (a dusun in North Sumatra and Rukun Tetangga 
(RT) in South Sulawesi and Central Java), and randomly selected one of these sub-villages for 
the experiment. These sub-village units are best thought of as neighborhoods. Each sub-village 
contains an average of 54 households and has an elected or appointed administrative head, whom 
we refer to as the sub-village head. 
II.C. Experimental Design 
In each sub-village, the Central Statistics Bureau (BPS) and Mitra Samya, an Indonesian NGO, 
implemented an unconditional cash transfer program, where beneficiary households would 
receive a one-time, Rp. 30,000 (about $3) cash transfer. The amount of the transfer is equal to 
about 10 percent of the median beneficiary’s monthly per-capita consumption, or a little more 
than one day’s wage for an average laborer.
9  
Each sub-village was randomly allocated to one of the three targeting treatments that are 
described in detail below.
10 The number of households that would receive the transfer was set in 
                                                 
8 An additional constraint was applied to the district of Serdang Bedagai because it had particularly large-sized sub-
villages. All villages in this district with average populations above 100 households per sub-village were excluded. 
In addition, five of the originally-selected villages were replaced prior to the randomization due to an inability to 
reach households during the baseline survey, the village head’s refusal to participate, or a conflict. 
9 While the amount of the transfer is substantially smaller than in the national BLT program (which distributed Rp. 
100,000 per month), the amount is substantial enough that poor households would want to receive it. In fact, in 
September 2008, more than twenty people were killed during a stampede involving thousands when a local wealthy 
person offered to give out charity of Rp. 30,000 per person (Kompas, 9/15/08). 
10 Administrative costs of the three programs were $65 per village for the community targeting, $146 for the PMT, 
and $166 for the hybrid.  Including the value of the community members’ time, the cost of the community targeting 10 
advance through a geographical targeting approach, which was applied identically in all villages 
such that the fraction of households in a sub-village that would receive the subsidy was held 
constant, on average, across the treatments. We then observed how each treatment selected the 
set of beneficiaries. 
 After the beneficiaries were finalized, the funds were distributed. To publicize the 
beneficiary lists, the program staff posted two copies of the list in visible locations such as 
roadside food stalls, mosques/churches, or the sub-village head’s house. They also placed a 
suggestion box and a stack of complaint cards next to the list, along with a reminder about the 
program details and the complaint process. Depending on the sub-village head’s preference, the 
cash distribution could occur either through door-to-door handouts or by gathering the recipients 
at a central location. After at least three days, the program staff collected the suggestion box.  
Main Treatment 1: PMT 
In the PMT treatment, the government created formulas that mapped easily observable 
household characteristics into a single index using regression techniques. Specifically, it created 
a list of 49 indicators similar to those used in Indonesia’s registration of the poor in 2008, 
encompassing the household’s home attributes (wall type, roof type, etc.), assets (TV, motorbike, 
etc.), household composition, and household head’s education and occupation. Using pre-
existing survey data, the government estimated the relationship between these variables and 
household per-capita consumption.
11 While it collected the same set of indicators in all regions, 
the government estimated district-specific formulas due to the high variance in the best 
predictors of poverty across districts. On average, these PMT regressions had an R
2 value of 0.48 
(Appendix Table 1). 
                                                                                                                                                             
was $110, the cost of the PMT was $153, and the cost of the hybrid is $213.  The high cost of targeting in the 
community and hybrid methods was due in part to high fixed costs of setting up the targeting systems; we expect the 
administrative costs to fall if the methods were scaled up. 
 
11 Data from Indonesia’s SUSENAS (2007) and World Bank’s Urban Poverty Project (2007) datasets were used to 
determine the weights on the PMT formula. 11 
Government enumerators collected these indicators from all households in the PMT 
villages by conducting a door-to-door survey. These data were then used to calculate a computer-
generated poverty score for each household using the district-specific PMT formula. A list of 
beneficiaries was generated by selecting the pre-determined number of households with the 
lowest PMT scores in each sub-village.  
Main Treatment 2: Community Targeting 
In the community treatment, the sub-village residents determine the list of beneficiaries through 
a poverty-ranking exercise. To start, a local facilitator visited each sub-village, informed the sub-
village head about the program, and set a date for a community meeting. The meeting dates were 
set several days in advance to allow the facilitator and sub-village head sufficient time to 
publicize the meeting. Facilitators made door-to-door household visits in order to encourage 
attendance. On average, 45 percent of households attended the meeting. 
At the meeting, the facilitator first explained the program. Next, he displayed a list of all 
households in the sub-village (from the baseline survey), and asked the attendees to correct the 
list if necessary. The facilitator then spent 15 minutes having the community brainstorm a list of 
characteristics that differentiate the poor households from the wealthy ones in their community.
12  
The facilitator then proceeded with the ranking exercise using a set of randomly-ordered 
index cards that displayed the names of each household in the sub-village. He hung a string from 
wall to wall, with one end labeled as “most well-off” (paling mampu) and the other side labeled 
as “poorest” (paling miskin). Then, he presented the first two name cards from the randomly-
ordered stack to the community and asked, “Which of these two households is better off?” Based 
on the community’s response, he attached the cards along the string, with the poorer household 
placed closer to the “poorest” end. Next, he displayed the third card and asked how this 
                                                 
12 These characteristics or criteria were not used explicitly in the ranking; they were instead used to help 
communities think about how they would differentiate households while making the ranking decisions.  12 
household ranked relative to the first two households. The activity continued with the facilitator 
placing each card one-by-one on the string until all the households had been ranked.
13 By and 
large, the community reached a consensus on the ranks.
14 Before the final ranking was recorded, 
the facilitator read the ranking aloud so adjustments could be made if necessary.  
After all meetings were complete, the facilitators were provided with “beneficiary 
quotas” for each sub-village based on the geographic targeting procedure. Households ranked 
below the quota were deemed eligible. Note that prior to the ranking exercise, facilitators told the 
meeting attendees that the quotas were predetermined by the government, and that all households 
who were ranked below this quota would receive the transfer. Facilitators also emphasized that 
the government would not interfere with the community’s ranking.  
Main Treatment 3: Hybrid 
The hybrid method combines the community ranking procedure with a subsequent PMT 
verification. In this method, the ranking exercise, described above, was implemented first. 
However, there was one key difference: at the start of these meetings, the facilitator announced 
that the lowest-ranked households, those ranked 1.5 times below the “beneficiary quotas,” would 
be independently checked by government enumerators before the list was finalized. 
After the community meetings were complete, government enumerators visited the 
lowest-ranked households to collect the data needed to calculate their PMT score. Beneficiary 
lists were then determined using the PMT formulas. Thus, it was possible, for example, that 
some households could become beneficiaries even if they were ranked as slightly wealthier than 
the beneficiary quota cutoff line on the community list (and vice versa). 
                                                 
13 When at least 10 households had been ranked, the facilitator began comparing each card to the middle card (or if it 
was higher than the middle card, to the 75
th percentile card), and so on, in order to speed up the process. 
14 If the community did not know a household or if the household’s status could not be decided upon, the facilitator 
and several community members visited the household after the meeting and then added it to the rank list based on 
the information gained from the visit. In practice, only 2 of the 431 community or hybrid villages had any 
households that could not be ranked at the meetings (19 out of 67 households at one meeting, all of whom were 
boarders at a boarding house, and 5 out of 36 households at the second meeting.). 
 13 
The hybrid treatment aims to take advantage of the relative benefits of both methods. 
First, as compared to the community method, the hybrid method’s additional PMT verification 
phase may limit elite capture. Second, in the hybrid method, the community is incentivized to 
accurately rank the poorest households at the bottom of the list, as richer households would later 
be eliminated by the PMT. Third, as compared to the PMT treatment, the hybrid method’s use of 
the community rankings to narrow the set of households that need to be surveyed may be 
potentially more cost-effective, in light of the fewer household visits required.  
Community Sub-Treatments 
We designed several sub-treatments in order to test three hypotheses about why the results from 
the community process might differ from those that resulted from the PMT treatment: elite 
capture, community effort, and within-community heterogeneity in preferences. 
First, to test for elite capture, we randomly assigned the community and hybrid sub-
villages to two groups: a “whole community” sub-treatment and an “elite” sub-treatment. In 
“whole community” villages, the facilitators actively recruited all community members to 
participate in the ranking. In the “elite” villages, meeting attendance was restricted to no more 
than seven invitees that were chosen by the sub-village head. Inviting at least one woman was 
mandatory and there was some pressure to invite individuals who are usually involved in village 
decision-making, such as religious leaders or school teachers. The elite meetings are smaller and 
hence easier to organize and run. Moreover, the elites may have the legitimacy needed (and 
possibly even better information) to make difficult choices. However, the danger of the elite 
meetings is that the elites will use their influence to funnel aid to their friends and family 
(Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005). 
  Second, we introduced two treatments to investigate whether the efficacy of the 
community approach is limited by the ability or willingness of the community to put in the effort 
needed to make accurate community rankings. First, the order in which households were ranked 14 
was randomized in order to compare the accuracy at the start and the end of the meeting.
15 The 
ranking procedure is tedious: on average, it took 1.68 hours for the community to complete the 
rankings. For a community with the mean number of households (54), even an optimal sorting 
algorithm would require making 6 pair-wise comparisons by the time the last card was placed. It 
is thus plausible that towards the end of the longer meetings, the community members may be 
too tired to rank accurately. Second, in half of the meetings, the facilitator led an exercise to 
identify the ten poorest households in the sub-village before the ranking exercise began (“10 
poorest treatment”). If effort is important, this treatment should increase accuracy by ensuring 
that the poor are identified before fatigue sets in.  
The third set of hypotheses concerns the role of preferences. If the community results 
differ from the PMT results because of preferences, it is important to understand whether these 
preferences are broadly shared or are simply a function of who attends the meeting. Meeting 
times were therefore varied in order to attract different subsets of the community. Half of the 
meetings were randomly assigned to occur after 7:30 pm, when men who work during the day 
could easily attend. The rest were in the afternoon, when we expected higher female attendance.  
Randomization Design and Timing 
We randomly assigned each of the 640 sub-villages to the treatments as follows (see Table 1). In 
order to ensure experimental balance across geographic regions, we created 51 geographic strata, 
where each stratum consists of all villages from one or more sub-districts (kecamatan) and is 
entirely located in a single district (kabupaten).
16 Then, we randomly allocated sub-villages to 
one of the three main treatments (PMT, community, or hybrid), stratifying such that the 
proportion of sub-villages allocated to each main treatment was identical (up to integer 
                                                 
15 Any new household cards that were added to the stack during this process were ranked last due to the logistical 
complexity of re-randomizing the order of the entire stack.  
16 Specifically, we first assigned each of the 68 subdistricts (kecamatan) in the sample to a unique stratum. We then 
took all subdistricts with 5 or fewer sampled subdistricts and merged them with other kecamatans in the same 
district, so that each of the resulting 51 strata had at least 6 sampled villages. Note that a subdistrict is the next-
highest administrative unit above a village, and consist of 5-20 villages and 15,000 – 50,000 inhabitants. 15 
constraints) within each stratum. We then randomly and independently allocated each 
community or hybrid sub-village to the sub-treatments, with each of these three sub-treatment 
randomizations stratified by stratum and main treatment.  
From November to December 2008, an independent survey company conducted a census 
in each sub-village and then collected the baseline data. The targeting treatments and the creation 
of the beneficiary lists started immediately after the baseline survey was completed (December 
2008 and January 2009). Fund distribution, the collection of the complaint form boxes, and 
interviews with the sub-village heads occurred during February 2009. Finally, the survey 
company conducted the endline survey in late February and early March 2009. 
III. Data 
We collected four main sources of data: a baseline household survey, household rankings 
generated by the treatments, data on the community meeting process (in community/hybrid 
treatments only), and data on community satisfaction. In this section, we describe the data 
collection effort, and then provide summary statistics and a test of the randomization. 
III.A. Baseline Data 
We conducted a baseline survey in November and December 2008. The survey was administered 
by SurveyMeter, an independent survey organization. At this point, there was no mention of the 
experiment to households.
17 We began by constructing a complete list of all households in the 
sub-village. From this census, we randomly sampled eight households from each sub-village plus 
the head of the sub-village, for a total sample size of 5,756 households.
18 To ensure gender 
balance among survey respondents, in each sub-village, households were randomized as to 
whether the household head or spouse of the household head would be targeted as the primary 
respondent. The survey included questions on demographics, their family networks in the sub-
                                                 
17 In fact, SurveyMeter enumerators were not told about the targeting experiment. 
18 In four of the sub-villages, there were seven respondents rather than eight due to respondent refusals. 16 
village, participation in community activities, relationships with local leaders, access to existing 
social transfer programs, and detailed data on the households’ per capita consumption.  
The baseline survey also included a variety of measures of the household’s subjective 
poverty assessments. In particular, we asked each household to rank the other eight households 
surveyed in their sub-village from poorest to richest. We also asked each respondent to list the 
five poorest and five richest households in the sub-village, as well as any households whom they 
considered formal or informal leaders in the sub-village. To measure “elite connectedness,” we 
asked respondents to identify any household in the sub-village that was related by marriage or 
blood to those that they identified as poor, rich, or leaders. Finally, we asked respondents several 
subjective questions to determine how they assessed their own poverty levels.  
III.B. Data on treatment results 
Each of our treatments – PMT, community, and hybrid – produces a rank ordering of all 
households in the sub-village (“targeting rank list”). For the PMT treatment, this is the rank 
ordering of the PMT score, i.e. predicted per capita expenditures. For the community treatment, 
it is the ranking of households that was constructed during the community meetings. For the 
hybrid treatment, it is the final ranked list (where all households that were verified are ordered 
based on their PMT score, while those that were not are ordered based on their rank at the 
community meeting). For all treatments, we additionally collected data on which households 
actually received the transfer (i.e. which households fell below each sub-village quota).  
III.C. Data on community meetings 
For the community and hybrid sub-villages, we collected data on the meetings’ functioning. We 
collected attendance lists, including the number of female participants.
19 The facilitators 
recorded the household identifiers of the ten poorest households listed in the “10 poorest 
                                                 
19The attendance form that was used in the elite sub-treatment was somewhat different than in the whole community 
treatment, so we verified the attendance results by treatment using data from the endline household survey. All other 
forms were identical across all sub-treatments.  17 
treatment.” After each meeting, the facilitators filled out a questionnaire on their perceptions of 
the community’s interest and satisfaction with the ranking exercise.  
III.D. Data on community satisfaction 
After the cash disbursement was complete, we collected data on the community’s satisfaction 
level using four different tools: suggestion boxes, sub-village head interviews, facilitator 
feedback, and household interviews. First, facilitators placed suggestion boxes in each sub-
village along with a stack of complaint cards. Each anonymous complaint card asked three 
yes/no questions in a simple format: (1) Are you satisfied with the beneficiary list resulting from 
this program? (2) Are there any poor households not included on the list? (3) Are there any non-
poor households included on the list? Second, on the day when suggestion boxes were collected, 
the facilitators interviewed the sub-village heads and asked about complaints submitted to them 
verbally.
20 Sub-village heads were also asked if they were personally satisfied with the targeting 
outcome. Third, each facilitator filled out feedback forms on the ease of distributing the transfer 
payments. Finally, in Central Java province, SurveyMeter conducted an endline survey of three 
households that were randomly chosen from the eight baseline survey households, using 
questions that were similar to those asked of the sub-village head.
21  
III.E. Summary statistics 
Table 2 provides sample statistics of the key variables. Panel A shows that average monthly per 
capita expenditures are approximately Rp. 558,000 (about $50).  
  Panel B provides statistics on the mis-targeting rates. By construction, about 30 percent 
of the households received the cash transfer. We calculate how many households were mis-
targeted using the per capita consumption data from the baseline survey to determine eligibility. 
Specifically, we calculated the per-capita consumption level in each province (separately by 
                                                 
20We intended to randomly re-assign facilitators’ designated sub-villages after the fund distribution so that no 
facilitator would collect the sub-village head’s feedback from an area that he or she had already visited. While this 
proved logistically impossible in North Sumatra, the re-assignment was implemented in the other provinces. 
21Time and budget constraints prevented the possibility of surveying in North Sumatra and South Sulawesi.  18 
urban and rural areas) that corresponded to the percentage of households who were supposed to 
receive the transfer. This threshold level is approximately equal to the PPP$2 poverty line.
22 We 
defined “mis-target” to be equal to 1 if either the household’s per capita consumption was below 
the threshold line and it did not receive the transfer (exclusion errors) or if it was above the 
threshold line and did receive it (inclusion errors). We also calculate mis-target for subsets of the 
population: those below the threshold, whom we call the “poor” (divided in half into the “very 
poor,” with per-capita consumption below approximately PPP$1, and the “near poor,” with per-
capita consumption between approximately PPP$1 and PPP$2) and those above the threshold, 
whom we call the “non-poor” (divided in half into “middle income” and “rich”). As shown in 
Panel B, 32 percent of the households were mis-targeted. Twenty percent of the non-poor 
households received it, while 53 percent of the poor were excluded. Specifically, the rich are the 
least likely to be mis-targeted (14 percent), while the near poor are the most likely (59 percent).
23  
  Panel C provides summary statistics for several alternative metrics that can be used to 
gauge targeting: the rank correlation for each sub-village between one of four different metrics of 
household well-being and results of the targeting experiment (“targeting rank list”). By using 
rank correlations, we can flexibly examine the relationship between the treatment outcomes and 
various measures of well-being on a comparable scale. First, we compute the rank correlation 
with per capita consumption, which tells us how closely the final outcome is to the government’s 
metric of well-being. Second, we compute the rank correlation with the ranks provided by the 
eight individual households during the baseline survey. This allows us to understand how close 
                                                 
22 To see this, note that adjusting the 2005 International Price Comparison Project’s PPP-exchange rate for Indonesia 
for inflation through the end of 2008 yields a PPP exchange rate of PPP$1 = Rp. 5549 (author’s calculations based 
on World Bank 2008 and the Indonesian CPI). The PPP$2 per day per person poverty line therefore corresponds to 
per-capita consumption of Rp. 338,000 per month. In our sample, the average threshold below which households 
should have received the transfer is Rp. 320,000 per month, or almost exactly PPP$2 per day. The slight discrepancy 
is due to different regional price deflators used in the geographic targeting procedure. 
23 Note that measurement error in our consumption survey means that these mis-targeting rates are likely over-
estimates of the “true” mistargeting rates. This measurement error will be identical in treatment and control, 
however, so it will not affect our estimate of changes in mistargeting across treatment conditions. 19 
the targeting rank list is to the community member’s individual beliefs about their fellow 
community members’ well-being. Third, we compute the rank correlation with the ranks 
provided by the sub-village head in the baseline survey, which does the same thing for the sub-
village head’s views. Finally, we compute the rank correlation with respondents’ self-assessment 
of poverty, as reported in the baseline survey.
24 This allows us to understand how closely the 
treatment result matches individuals’ beliefs about their own well-being.  
  While targeting rank lists are associated with consumption rankings, they are more highly 
associated with the community’s rankings of well-being. While the mean rank correlation 
between the targeting rank lists and the consumption rankings is 0.41, the mean correlation of the 
targeting rank list with the individual community members’ ranks is 0.64, and the correlation 
with the sub-village head’s ranks is 0.58. Finally, we observe a 0.40 correlation between the 
ranks from the targeted lists with the individuals’ self assessments of their own poverty. 
III.F. Randomization Balance Check 
Before turning to the results, we first examine whether the randomization for the main treatments 
appears balanced across covariates. We chose ten variables for this check prior to obtaining the 
data from the experiment.
25 Specifically, we examined the following characteristics from the 
baseline survey: per capita expenditures, years of education of the household head, calculated 
PMT score, the share of households that are agricultural, and the years of education of the sub-
village head. We also examined five village characteristics from the 2008 PODES, a census of 
villages conducted by BPS: log number of households, distance to district center in kilometers, 
log size of the village in hectares, the number of religious buildings per household, and the 
number of primary schools per household. We present the results from this analysis in Table 3. 
                                                 
24Specifically, each household was asked “Please imagine a six-step ladder where on the bottom (the first step) stand 
the poorest people and on the highest step (the sixth step) stand the richest people. On which step are you today?” 
Each respondent responded with a number from 1 to 6, and we use the rank of this response among respondents in a 
village in computing the rank correlation. 
25In fact, we specified and documented all of the main regressions in the paper before examining the data (April 3, 
2009). The document is available from the authors upon request. 20 
In Columns 1, 2, and 3, we present the mean of each variable for the sub-villages assigned to the 
PMT, community, and hybrid treatments, respectively. Standard deviations are listed below the 
means in brackets. We present the difference in means between the community and the PMT 
groups in Column 4, between the hybrid and the PMT in Column 5, and between the hybrid and 
the community in Column 6. In Columns 7 – 9, we replicate the analysis shown in Columns 4-6, 
but additionally control for stratum fixed effects. Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses in Columns 4 – 9. All variables are aggregated to the sub-village level; thus each 
regression includes 640 observations. In the final row of Table 3, we provide the p-value of a test 
of joint significance of the difference across each of the outcome variables.  
  The sub-villages appear to be generally well-balanced across the ten characteristics. Out 
of the sixty individual differences presented, three are statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level – precisely what one would expect from random chance. All of these significant differences 
are in Column 9, which compares the community and hybrid methods, controlling for stratum 
fixed effects. Specifically, controlling for stratum fixed effects, households in community 
locations have less education and are less likely to be agriculturists than households in the hybrid 
treatment, and hybrid villages have 8 percent fewer households than community villages. 
Looking at the joint significance tests across all ten variables considered, without stratum fixed 
effects, the only jointly significant difference is between the hybrid and the community (Column 
6, p-value 0.089); with stratum fixed effects (Column 9), the p-value is 0.028. All results in this 
paper are robust to specifications that include these additional ten control variables.  
IV. Results on Targeting Performance and Satisfaction 
We begin by evaluating the treatments from the government’s perspective. Specifically, we 
examine (1) how the treatments performed in terms of targeting the poor based on per-capita 
consumption, the metric the government uses to assess poverty, and (2) how the treatments 
performed in terms of satisfaction with and legitimacy of the targeting results.  21 
IV.A. Targeting performance based on per-capita consumption 
We begin by comparing how the different targeting methods performed based on per-capita 
consumption levels, the metric of poverty used by the government. Specifically, as discussed 
above we compute location-specific poverty lines based on the PPP$2 per day consumption 
threshold, and then classify a household as mis-targeted if its per capita consumption levels is 
below the poverty line and it was not chosen as a beneficiary, or if it was above the poverty line 
and it was identified as a recipient (MISTARGETivk). We then examine which method 
minimized mis-targeting by estimating the following equation using OLS:  
MISTARGETivk= α + β1COMMUNITYivk + β2HYBRIDivk + γk + εivk (1) 
where i represents a household, v represents a sub-village, k represents a stratum, and γk are 
stratum fixed effects.
26 Note that the PMT treatment is the omitted category, so β1 and β2 are 
interpretable as the impact of the community and the hybrid treatments relative to the PMT 
treatment. Since the targeting methods were assigned at the sub-village level, the standard errors 
are clustered to allow for arbitrary correlation within a sub-village.  
The results, shown in Table 4, indicate that the PMT method outperforms both the 
community and hybrid treatment in terms of the mis-target rate that is based on consumption. 
Under the PMT, 30 percent of the households are mis-targeted (Column 1).
27 Both the 
community and hybrid methods increase the mis-targeting rate by about 3 percentage points —or 
about 10 percent— relative to the PMT method (significant at the ten percent level).
28  
                                                 
26 For simplicity of interpretation, we use OLS / linear probability models for all dependent variables in Table 4. 
Using a probit model for the binary dependent variables produces the same signs of the results, and the same levels 
of statistical significance. 
27 Fluctuations in consumption between the date of the baseline survey and that of targeting could lead to 
overinflated mistargeting rates.  To minimize this, we ensured that the targeting quickly followed the baseline 
survey: the average time lapse was only 44 days. We also ensured that the time elapsed between the baseline survey 
and the targeting was orthogonal to the treatment. Appendix Table 2 also shows that the time between survey and 
targeting date has no effect empirically on the mis-targeting rates, and that the interaction of time elapsed with the 
treatment dummies is never significant. 
28 The community treatment provides a relative ranking of households; it does not provide any indication of the 
absolute level of poverty. As a result, we chose the fraction of households in each sub-village that would become 
beneficiaries of the program through geographic targeting. For consistency, we use the geographic targeting across 22 
Adding a rich household to the list may have different welfare implications than adding a 
household that is just above the poverty line. To examine this, Figure 1 graphs the log per capita 
consumption distribution of the beneficiaries (left panel) and non-beneficiaries (right panel) for 
each targeting treatment. The vertical lines in the graphs indicate the PPP$1 and PPP$2 per day 
poverty lines. Overall, the graphs confirm that all methods select relatively poorer households: 
for all methods the mode per-capita consumption for beneficiaries is below PPP$2 per day, 
whereas it is above PPP$2 per day for non-beneficiaries. 
Examining the impact of the treatments, the left panel shows that the consumption 
distribution of beneficiaries derived from the PMT is centered to the left of the distribution under 
the community and hybrid methods. Thus, on average, the PMT identifies poorer individuals. 
However, the community methods select a greater percentage of beneficiaries whose log daily 
per-capita consumption is less than PPP$1 (the leftmost part of the distribution). Thus, the 
figures suggest that despite doing worse on average, the community methods may capture more 
of the very poor. Moreover, the figures suggest that all three methods contain similar proportions 
of richer individuals (with log income greater than about 6.5). The difference in mis-targeting 
across the three treatments is driven by differences in the near poor (PPP$1 to PPP$2) and the 
middle income group (those above the PPP$2 poverty line, but with log income less than 6.5).  
We more formally examine the findings from Figure 1 in the remaining columns of Table 
4. In Columns 2 and 3, we examine mis-targeting separately for the poor and the non-poor. In 
Columns 4 and 5, we disaggregate the non-poor into rich and middle, and in Columns 6 and 7, 
we disaggregate the poor by splitting them into near poor and very poor. The results confirm that 
much of the difference in the error rate between the community methods and the PMT occurs 
                                                                                                                                                             
all three treatments. However, by imposing this constraint on the PMT, we do not take full advantage of the fact that 
the PMT provides absolute measures of poverty.  Taking advantage of this information, the error in the PMT is 
further reduced by 3-percentage points. Thus, the full-information PMT would perform 6-percentage points (or 20 
percent) better that the community methods in selecting the poor. This analysis is available upon request. 23 
near the cutoff for inclusion. Specifically, the community and hybrid methods are respectively 
6.7 and 5.2 percentage points more likely to misclassify the middle non-poor (Column 5, both 
statistically significant at 5 percent). They are also more likely to misclassify the near poor by 
4.9 and 3.1 percentage points, respectively, although these results are not individually 
statistically significant. In contrast, we observe much less difference between the PMT and 
community methods for the rich and the very poor, and in fact the point estimate suggests that 
the community method may actually do better among the very poor.
29  
  In Column 8, we examine the average per capita consumption of beneficiaries across the 
three groups. As expected, given that the community treatment selects more of the very poor and 
also selects more individuals who are just above the PPP$2 poverty line, the average per capita 
consumption of beneficiaries is not substantially different between the various treatments. This 
suggests that even though the community treatments are more likely to mis-target the poor as 
defined by the PPP$2 cutoff, the welfare implications of the three methods appear similar based 
on the consumption metric.
30 
  To end this sub-section we explore the heterogeneity in the results along several key sub-
village characteristics.
31 First, we examine whether the community methods do worse in urban 
areas, where individuals may not know their neighbors as well. Our sample was specifically 
stratified along this dimension. Second, we hypothesized that the community methods may work 
better in areas with higher inequality, where inequality is defined as the range between the 20
th 
and the 80
th percentile per capita consumption levels, since greater inequality implies that the 
                                                 
29 In results not reported in the table, we find that the difference in the community treatment’s impact on mis-
targeting rates between the very poor and the non-poor is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
30 To maximize social welfare, the targeting method should select households with the highest average marginal 
utility. If utility is quadratic in per-capita consumption, marginal utility is exactly equal to per-capita consumption, 
so the regression in column (8) shows that there are no difference in average marginal utility across the three 
treatments based on this metric. In results not reported in the table, we have also confirmed that the average 
marginal utility of beneficiaries is the same across treatments using alternate specifications for the utility function as 
well, including CRRA utility with ρ = 1 (log), 2, 3, 4, and 5.  
31 Note that we specified these hypotheses regarding the heterogeneity of the treatment prior to obtaining the data. 24 
rich and poor are more sharply differentiated. Third, we hypothesized that in areas where many 
people are related to one other by blood or marriage, they have more information about their 
neighbors, so the community method should work better. The results are presented in Appendix 
Table 3. There was less mis-targeting in the community treatment (relative to the PMT) in urban 
areas, in areas with high inequality, and in areas where many households are related. However, 
these effects are not significant at conventional levels.  
IV.B. Satisfaction 
In Table 5, we study the impacts of the treatments on the communities’ satisfaction levels and 
the legitimacy of the targeting. Panel A presents data from the endline household survey. Panel B 
presents data from the follow-up survey of sub-village heads. Panel C presents the results from 
the anonymous comment box, the community’s complaints to the village head, and the facilitator 
comments on the ease of distributing the transfer payments.
32  
  The results from the endline survey (Panel A) show that individuals are much more 
satisfied with the community treatment than with the PMT or hybrid treatments. For example, in 
the community treatment, respondents wish to make fewer changes to the beneficiary list; they 
would prefer to add about one-third fewer households to the list of beneficiaries (Column 4) and 
subtract about one-half as many households (Column 5) than in the PMT or the hybrid 
treatments. Individuals in the community treatment are more likely to report that the method 
used was appropriate (Column 1) and are also more likely to state that they are satisfied with the 
program (Column 2). A joint test of the dependent variables in Panel A indicates that the 
community treatment differences are jointly statistically significant (p-value < 0.001).  
  Sub-village heads are also much more satisfied (Panel B). The sub-village head was 38 
percentage points more likely to say that the targeting method was appropriate when community-
                                                 
32 For simplicity of interpretation, we use OLS/linear probability models for all dependent variables in Table 5. 
Using ordered probit for categorical response variables and probit for binary dependent variables produces the same 
signs of the results, and the same levels of statistical significance. 25 
based targeting was used and 17 percentage points less likely to name any households that 
should be added to the list.  
The higher levels of satisfaction were manifested in fewer complaints (Panel C). There 
were on average 1.09 fewer complaints in the comment box for the community treatment sub-
villages relative to the PMT sub-villages, and 0.55 fewer complaints in the hybrid sub-villages 
relative to the PMT (Column 2). The sub-village head also reported receiving 2.68 and 2.01 
fewer complaints in the community and hybrid treatment, respectively (Column 3).  
  The higher satisfaction levels in the community treatment led to a smoother disbursal 
process. First, the facilitators who distributed the cash payment were 4-6 percentage points less 
likely to experience difficulties while doing so in sub-villages assigned to the community or 
hybrid method (Panel C, Column 4). Second, the sub-village heads had a choice of how the 
facilitator would conduct the disbursals: they could do so in an open community meeting or, if 
the head felt that they would encounter problems in the village, the facilitator could distribute the 
transfer door-to-door. Facilitators were 8 percentage points more likely to distribute the cash in 
an open meeting in the sub-villages assigned to the community treatment (Panel D, Column 5). 
They were also 5 percentage points more likely to do so in sub-villages that were assigned to the 
hybrid treatment, but this result is not significant at conventional levels.
33 
                                                 
33 An important question is whether these differences in satisfaction represent changes from the act of directly 
participating in the process (as in Olken (forthcoming)), from knowing that some local process was followed, or 
from changes in the final listing of beneficiaries. Two pieces of evidence shed light on this question. First, we find 
no differences in our measures of satisfaction between the whole community treatments (when 48 percent of 
households attended the meeting) and elite community treatments (when only 17.6 percent of households attended 
the meeting). This finding suggests that it is either differences in the list or knowing that some type of local process 
was followed that drives the differences in satisfaction. Second, we computed an approximate PMT score for each 
individual who was surveyed in the baseline, regardless of treatment, and then we computed the rank correlation 
between this score and the targeting rank list that resulted from the experiment.  This gives us a measure of how 
close the community’s list would “match” the PMT. We also created a dummy variable that indicates a high 
correlation between these two measures, and interacted this variable with the community and hybrid treatments. 
There is no discernable difference across the different satisfaction measures; this implies that the higher satisfaction 
that was observed in the community treatment was not affected by the degree to which the community’s list would 
match the PMT. Thus, this suggests that knowing that some type of local process was followed seems to drive the 
satisfaction levels.  These tables were omitted for brevity, but are available from the authors upon request. 26 
IV.C Understanding the differences between PMT and community targeting 
The findings present an interesting puzzle. The results on mis-targeting suggest that the 
community-based methods actually do somewhat worse at identifying the poor. However, the 
community method results in much greater satisfaction among both citizens and the sub-village 
head. The following sections explore alternative explanations of why the PMT and the 
community methods differ: elite capture, community effort problems, heterogeneity in 
preferences within the villages, and differences in information.  
V. Elite Capture 
Community-based targeting may involve a tradeoff: it allows the government to make use of 
local knowledge, but it also potentially opens the door for elite capture. To the extent that elites 
have different social welfare weights from the community as a whole (λe ≠ λc), greater elite 
control over the process should lead to more resources being directed at those households with 
high λe and worse overall targeting performance. The increased latitude for elite capture is one 
potential explanation for why the community targeting fared worse than the PMT. 
We test for elite capture by examining the community sub-treatments that vary the level 
of elite control. Specifically, we would expect less elite capture in the hybrid treatment, where 
there is ex-post verification of the community’s ranking. We would also expect more elite 
capture in the elite sub-treatment, when only elite members were invited to participate in the 
rankings. We start by re-estimating equation (1), including a dummy for the ELITE sub-
treatment and, in some specifications, the interaction of ELITE and HYBRID. The results are 
presented in Table 6. 
  We first verify that the treatment had an impact on meeting attendance. Columns 1 and 2 
calculate the attendance rate using data collected at the meeting, while Columns 3 and 4 calculate 27 
it using the data from the endline household survey.
34 Both measures confirm that the whole 
community meetings were substantially better attended than the elite-only meetings. For 
example, the survey data (Column 3) show that 48 percent of households attended the targeting 
meetings in the whole community treatment, compared to 18 percent in the elite sub-treatment. 
  Despite these differences in attendance, the mis-targeting rate for the elite treatment was 
not significantly different than for the whole community treatment (Column 5 of Table 6). In 
Column 6, we examine the interaction of elite and hybrid. We would expect less elite capture in 
hybrid treatment, where the government verifies the results. In fact, if anything we find more 
mis-targeting in the hybrid methods when only the elites are invited.  
Overall, while the whole community meetings were more inclusive than the “elite” 
meetings, it does not appear that the presence of the full community affected the degree of elite 
capture. However, while the evidence presented in Table 6 is consistent with no elite capture, it 
is also consistent with the elite dominating the whole community meetings, leading to the result 
that both types of meetings reflect their preferences.
35 To test this, we examine whether the elites 
and their relatives (those with high λe) were more likely to be selected in both the whole 
community and elite meetings relative to the PMT in Table 7. Specifically, we estimate the 
following equation: 
MISTARGETivk= α + β1COMMUNITYivk + β2 HYBRIDivk + β3 ELITEivk + β4 CONNivk + β5 
(COMMUNITYivk × CONNivk)+ β6 (HYBRIDivk × CONNivk) + β7 (ELITEivk × CONNivk) + γk + εivk  (2) 
                                                 
34 Since the data in columns 1 and 2 come from the actual meetings, they are only available for the community and 
hybrid treatments. Since the data in columns 3 and 4 come from questions about generic targeting meetings, it is 
possible to report having attended a meeting (such as a meeting during the socialization of the program or a meeting 
about another targeted related activity) even though our project held no ranking meeting in their villages.  
35 This second story seems unlikely: the facilitators report that a few individuals dominated the conversation in only 
15 percent of the meetings, and that otherwise the meetings were a full community affair. 28 
where CONNivk is an indicator that equals one if the household is related to any of the sub-village 
leaders/elites, or is one of the leaders themselves.
36 Columns 1 and 2 examine the mis-targeting 
rate as the dependent variable, and columns 3 and 4 examine whether a household received the 
transfer as the dependent variable. We find little evidence of elite capture. In fact, the point 
estimates suggest the opposite: the elite connected households are less likely to be mis-targeted 
in the community and elite treatments, although the effect is not significant at conventional 
levels. In fact, we find that elites are actually penalized in the community meetings: elites and 
their relatives are about 6.7 to 7.8 percent less likely to be on the beneficiary list in the 
community meetings relative to PMT meetings (Columns 3 and 4).
37  
Overall, these findings suggest that the reason that the mis-targeting is worse under the 
community method is not due to increased elite capture of the community process. 
VI. Problems with Community Effort 
The community-based ranking process requires human effort to make each comparison. For 
example, ranking 75 households would require making at least 363 pair-wise comparisons.
38 One 
might imagine that the worse targeting in the community methods could result simply from 
fatigue as the ranking exercise progresses. We introduced two treatments to investigate the role 
of effort: randomization of the order in which the ranking happened and the 10 poorest treatment. 
                                                 
36 Specifically, we defined an “elite connected” household as any household where 1) we interviewed the household 
and found that a household member held a formal leadership position in the village, such as village or sub-village 
head, 2) at least two of the respondents we interviewed identified the household as holding either a formal or 
informal (tokoh) leadership role in the village, or 3) a household connected by blood or marriage to any household 
identified in (1) or (2). 
37 It is possible that elite connected households are more likely to be connected to other households in the sub-
village in general. In this case, the penalty in columns (3) and (4) may not be due to the fact that they are elite, but 
instead be due to the fact that the community believes that they will be “taken care of” by their relatives. In 
Appendix Table 4, we re-run the specifications in Table 7, now including both main effects and interacted effects of 
the households’ general connectedness within the village (specifically, a dummy variables for whether the household 
is related by blood or marriage to any other household in the village) as well as elite connectedness. The elite results 
stay robust (both in magnitude and significance) when controlling for general connectedness.  
38 The community sorting algorithm facilitators were instructed to use is called a binary insertion sort, which has 
been shown to require in expectation log2(n!) pairwise comparisons to sort a list of size n, which is the theoretical 
lower bound for comparison sorting (Knuth, 1998). In practice, the community may not perfectly implement this 
algorithm, so the number of comparisons may be even higher.  29 
Figure 2 graphs the relationship between mis-targeting and the randomized rank order 
from a non-parametric Fan regression, with cluster-bootstrapped 95 percent confidence intervals 
shown as dashed lines. The mis-targeting rate is lowest for the first few households ranked, but 
then rises sharply by the 20
th percentile of households. The magnitude is substantial – the point 
estimates imply that mis-targeting rates are between 5-10 percentage points lower for the first 
household than for households ranked in the latter half of the meeting. 
Table 8 reports results from investigating these issues in a regression framework. Column 
1 reports the results from estimating the relationship between the mis-targeting rate and the 
randomized rank order, which varies from 0 (household was ranked first) to 1 (the household 
was ranked last). The point estimate is positive, indicating a higher mis-targeting rate for 
households ranked later, but it is not statistically significant. In Column 2, we interact the order 
with the hybrid treatment. The results show that in the community treatment, there is 
substantially more mis-targeting at the end of the process: the first household ranked is 5.9 
percentage points less likely to be mis-targeted than the last household ranked (p-value 0.11). On 
net, the community treatment actually does slightly better than the PMT in the beginning, but 
substantially worse towards the end. This effect is completely undone in the hybrid, where the 
random rank order and the mis-targeting rate appear unrelated. Columns 5 and 6 examine how 
the rank order affects whether a household receives the transfer. The results show that on 
average, households ranked at the end of the meeting are 4.9 percentage points more likely to be 
on the beneficiary list than those ranked at the start (significant at the 10% level). The additional 
mis-targeting from being late in the list thus comes largely from richer households ranked toward 
the end of the process being more likely to be on the list.  
On the other hand, the ten poorest treatments, in which the poorest were identified first, 
had no effect on mis-targeting as shown in Columns 3 and 4. However, this may be due to the 30 
fact that most of the mis-targeting error was comprised of the near poor rather than the very poor.  
Overall, what is striking is that despite conventional wisdom which emphasizes the risks 
of elite capture, the main weakness of the community treatment appears instead to have been the 
amount of sustained attention it requires from the participants in order to be effective.  
VII. Does the Community Have a Different Maximand? 
A third potential reason why the community produced a different outcome than the PMT is that 
the community is actually doing its best to identify the poor, but has different ideas about how to 
define a poor population. The next section tries to explain why the community’s views on 
poverty might differ from that of per-capita consumption.  
VII.A. Alternative welfare metrics 
We begin by examining how the targeting outcomes compare not just against the government’s 
metric of welfare ug (captured by rg,, the ranking based on per-capita consumption), but also 
against alternative welfare metrics. In our baseline survey, we asked eight randomly chosen 
members of the community to confidentially rank each other from poorest to richest. We average 
the ranks to construct each household’s wealth rank according to the other community members, 
denoted rc. To capture welfare as measured from an elite perspective, denoted re, we examine 
how the sub-village head ranked these eight other households. To measure how people assess 
their own poverty, denoted ri, we asked all respondents to rate their own poverty level on a scale 
of 1 to 6. We computed the percentile rank of each measure to put them on the same scale.  
Table 9 presents the matrix of rank correlations between these alternative welfare 
metrics. The correlation matrix shows that while all of the welfare metrics are positively 
correlated, they clearly capture different things. Of particular note is the bottom row, which 
shows the correlations with self-assessments. While the rank correlation of self-assessments (ri) 
with consumption (rg) is only 0.26, that with community survey ranks (rc) is 0.45 and with the 31 
sub-village head survey ranks (re) is 0.41. Thus, the community and sub-village head ranks 
appear to capture how individuals feel about themselves better than per capita consumption. 
To assess the poverty targeting results against these alternative welfare metrics, we 
compute the rank correlation between targeting rank list derived from the experiment and each of 
four welfare metrics. We then examine the effectiveness of the various targeting treatments 
against these different measures of well-being by estimating: 
RANKCORRvkR= α + β1 COMMUNITYvk + β2 HYBRIDvk + γk + εvkR  (3) 
where RANKCORRvkR is the rank correlation between the targeting rank list and the well-being 
measure R in sub-village v. Stratum fixed effects (γk) are included. The results are reported in 
Table 10. As the data is aggregated to the village level, each regression has 640 observations.
39 
  The results provide striking evidence that per capita consumption as we measure it does 
not fully capture what the community calls welfare. Column 1 confirms the mis-targeting results 
that are shown in Table 4: both the community and hybrid treatment result in lower rank 
correlations with per-capita consumption than the PMT. Specifically, they are 6.5-6.7 percentage 
points, or about 14 percent, lower than the rank correlations obtained with PMT. However, they 
move away from consumption in a very clear direction – the community treatment increases the 
rank correlation with rc by 24.6 percentage points, or 49 percent above the PMT level. The 
hybrid also increases the correlation with rc but the magnitude is about half that of the 
community treatment. Thus, the verification in the hybrid appears to move the final outcome 
away from the community’s perception of well-being. These differences are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. Results using the rank list obtained in the survey from the sub-
village head (our measure of re) are virtually identical to the survey list obtained by the 
                                                 
39Self-assessments have 637 observations due to non-response on the self-assessment question in several villages. 32 
community, and are also statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This provides further 
evidence that the community at large and the elite broadly share similar assessments of welfare. 
  Perhaps most importantly, we find that the community treatment increases the rank 
correlation between the targeting outcomes and the individual self-assessments of their own 
poverty (rs) by 10.2 percentage points, or about 30 percent of the level in the PMT (significant at 
1 percent). The hybrid treatment increases the same rank correlation by 7.5 percentage points. 
The community targeting methods are thus more likely to conform with people’s self-identified 
welfare status. 
VII.B. Are these preferences broadly shared? 
The results above suggest that the ranking exercise moves the targeting process towards a 
welfare metric identified by community members. An important question is the degree to which 
this reflects the view of one group within the community about who is poor. One experimental 
sub-treatment was designed precisely to get at this question. In Table 11, we report the effect of 
changing the composition of the meeting by holding the meeting during the day, when women 
are more likely to be able to attend. We also consider the other sub-treatments (elite and 10 
poorest) in this analysis, as they could also plausibly have affected the welfare weights of those 
at the meeting.  
We begin by investigating the impact of having a daytime meeting on attendance. This 
treatment does not change the share of households in the village that attend (Columns 1 and 2). 
However, Column 3 confirms that the percentage of households that are represented by women 
is about 10 percentage points (for a total of 49 percent) higher in the day meetings than during 
the evening meetings.  
Although the day meeting treatment affected the gender composition of the meetings, 
Columns 4 - 8 show that it did not affect the targeting outcomes. The elite treatment also did not 
affect the rank correlations with any of the various welfare metrics. Interestingly, the only sub-33 
treatment that affected the rank correlations was the 10 poorest treatment, which increased the 
correlation of the treatments with ranks from self assessments. Overall, there seems to be no 
evidence that the identity of the subgroup doing the ranking mattered. 
VIII. Understanding the Community’s Maximand 
The evidence so far suggests that the community has a systematic, broadly shared, notion of 
welfare that is not based on per-capita consumption, and that the community-based targeting 
methods reflect this different concept of welfare. This raises several key questions: Is the 
community simply mis-measuring consumption? Or does it value something other than 
consumption in evaluating individual welfare, i.e. is u
g ≠ u
c? And is that the whole story or does 
the community also weigh the welfare of some households more than others due to other social 
or political reasons– i.e., are the differences also because λg ≠ λc?  
VIII.A. Does the Community Lack Information to Evaluate Consumption? 
While there is no definitive way to prove that the community has all the information that is 
available in the PMT, the fact that those ranked early in the process were ranked at least as well 
as in the PMT suggests that information is not the main constraint. We can, however, test 
whether the community has information about consumption beyond that in the PMT. 
Specifically, we estimate: 
RANKINDijvk = α + β1 RANKCONSUMPTIONivk + β2 RANKPMTSCOREjvk + νj + εijvk  (4) 
where RANKINDijvk is household j’s rank of household i (all ranks are in percentiles), 
RANKCONSUMPTIONivk is the rank of household i’s per capita consumption in village v, and 
RANKPMTSCOREivk is the rank of household i’s PMT score that is computed using the baseline 
data. Fixed effects for the individual providing the ranking are included (νj), and standard errors 
are clustered at the village level. The results of this analysis are presented in Column 1 of Table 
12. In Column 2, we instead include all of the variables that enter the PMT score separately 
rather than including the rank of the PMT score. 34 
  Table 12 illustrates that the community has residual information. Consumption is still 
highly correlated with individuals’ ranks of other households from the baseline survey even after 
we control for the rank from the PMT. Controlling for the rank from the PMT, a one percentile 
increase in consumption rank is associated with a 0.132 percentile increase in individual 
household ranks of the community (Column 1). This is significant at the 1 percent level. In the 
more flexible specification presented in Column 2, the correlation between consumption rank 
and survey rank remains positive (0.088) and significant at the 1 percent level.  
The findings in Table 12 suggest that the community has residual information about 
consumption beyond that contained in the PMT score or even in the PMT variables. Moreover, 
the fact that almost all the PMT variables enter into the community ranks with plausible signs 
and magnitudes suggests that the community has most of the information in the PMT as well, but 
chooses to aggregate it in different ways. While we cannot completely rule out that the 
community lacks some information that is present in the PMT, the evidence here suggests that 
differences in information are not the primary drivers of the different results.  
VIII.B. A Different View of Individual Welfare 
Table 13 explores the relationship between the welfare metrics (community survey rank rc, elite 
survey rank re, and self-assessment rank rs), the targeting results in PMT, community, and hybrid 
villages, and a variety of household characteristics that might plausibly affect either the welfare 
functions (u) or the social welfare weights used in targeting (λ). In Columns 1 - 3, we present 
results of specifications where the dependent variable is the within-village rank of each 
household in the baseline survey according to different survey-based welfare metrics. In 
Columns 4 – 6, the dependent variable is the treatment rank, put on a corresponding metric 
where the lowest ranked (poorest) household in the dataset in each village is ranked 0 and the 35 
highest ranked (richest) household in the dataset in each village is ranked 1.
40 We control for the 
log of per capita consumption in all regressions, and therefore the coefficients can be interpreted 
as conditional on per-capita consumption. Thus, we identify where the community rankings 
deviate from ranking based on consumption. The current sub-section focuses on some of the 
possible deviations that come from sources of differences in u, while the next sub-section deals 
with potential differences in the λs.  
We find several dimensions of differences in the u’s. First, we find adjustments for 
equivalence scales. The PMT in our setting is explicitly defined using per-capita consumption. 
Thus, it makes no adjustment for economies of scale in the household. By contrast, all of the 
community welfare functions (Columns 1-3) reveal that the community believes that there are 
household economies of scale, so that conditional on per-capita consumption, those in larger 
households are considered to have higher welfare (as in Olken, 2005). Likewise, the same is true 
for the community ranking – which assigns almost an identical household size premium (Column 
5). Interestingly, for a given household size and consumption, all methods rank households with 
more kids as poorer, even though children generally cost less than adults (Deaton, 1997).  
Second, the community may know more about current consumption than the PMT, which 
aims to capture the permanent component of consumption. For example, if two families have the 
same per capita consumption, the one that is more elite connected may, for example, worry less 
about bad shocks because it can expect to get help from rich relatives and hence have higher 
welfare. The community might therefore feel that elite connected households are richer than their 
consumption indicates. Whether or not this is the correct theory, it aligns perfectly with what we 
find. The community survey ranks put about a 9 percentage point premium on being elite 
connected, and even the elite and self-assessed survey ranks place a 4.4 and 2.5 percentage point 
                                                 
40 Note that some of the variables included as explanatory variables – including household size, share of kids, 
household head education, and widowhood – were explicitly included in the PMT regression, which may explain 
why some of these variables are significant predictors of targeting in the PMT regressions. 36 
premium, respectively. The community treatment ranks place a 5.1 percentage point premium on 
elite connectedness.  
Similarly, there appears to be a premium for being better connected to the financial 
system. While total savings does not affect the rank, households that have a greater share of 
savings in a bank are classified as richer in both the individual surveys (Column 1-3) and the 
community meeting (Column 5).  
Finally, households with family outside the village (who can presumably send 
remittances), are ranked as less poor in terms of individual ranks, sub-village head ranks and the 
self-assessment, though not in the community meetings.  
VIII.C. A Different Weighting of Individual Welfares 
There are multiple reasons why all families may not get the same effective weights (λ) in the 
social welfare function. The simplest story is that of discrimination against ethnic or religious 
minorities or other marginal community members. We find no evidence of this: ethnic minorities 
are more likely to be ranked as poor in the community treatment, suggesting perhaps that even 
extra care is paid to them in the interest of social harmony (Column 5). In addition, we find no 
evidence of favoring families that are more engaged with the community. Contributing labor to 
village projects does not affect a family’s status. However, those who contribute money are 
viewed as rich (Column 1-3), though they are also likely to be ranked as richer by the PMT 
(Column 4). 
Another form of discrimination may result from the community’s desire to provide the 
“right” incentives to households. For example, a transfer may have less of a distortionary effect 
for “hardworking” or “deserving” families than for those that are below their earning potential. 
In this case, the former should get a higher weight in the community’s utility function.  To test 
this theory, we first look at the education level of the household head. Households where the 
household head has a primary education or less rank 2-4 percentage points poorer, conditional on 37 
their actual consumption. Similarly, households headed by a widow, those with a disability, and 
those where there is a serious illness are all rated poorer, conditional on actual consumption. The 
adjustment for widowhood is also reflected in the community treatment ranking, but not the 
disability and serious illness adjustments (Column 5).
41 Finally and rather interestingly, the 
village does not penalize those who spend a lot of money on smoking and drinking. Families 
with these attributes are actually ranked lower both in community surveys (Column 1-3), and 
community meetings (Column 5), suggesting that the village treats these preferences as problems 
for the family as a whole rather than as behaviors that should be punished. 
IX. Conclusion 
The debate regarding decentralization in targeting is usually framed in terms of the benefits of 
utilizing local information versus the costs of some form of malfeasance, such as elite capture. 
While we started with an experiment that took both of these ideas very seriously, our results 
point to a third (and possibly a fourth) factor as being very important: the community seems to 
have a widely shared objective function that the government does not necessarily share, and 
implementing this objective is a source of widespread satisfaction in the community. Moreover, 
what makes this objective function different is neither nepotism (elite capture) nor majoritarian 
prejudices. Rather, these preferences appear to be informed by a better understanding of factors 
that affect the earning potential or vulnerability of the household, such as the returns to scale 
within the family, incentives, and insurance, as compared to relying purely on consumption as 
the government does. Nor is there any evidence that the community lacks the information to 
identify the poor effectively—before fatigue sets in, the community process does at least as well 
as the PMT. The main constraint on the community’s effectiveness in identifying poor families 
                                                 
41 There are, of course, two interpretations of these findings. One interpretation is that households are conditioning 
on earnings ability – i.e., if you are highly educated but do not earn much, that is your fault and you should not 
receive subsidies for it. Another interpretation, however, is that education is merely another signal of poverty that is 
more easily observable to the community than actual consumption, though communities would need to be over-
weighting this signal for this effect to produce a negative coefficient conditional on actual consumption. 38 
based on the consumption metric appears to be the onset of fatigue. Future designs of community 
based methods will need to contend with this factor. 
Given these findings, if targeting the poor based on consumption is the only objective, the 
PMT does dominate the community methods. However, it is not evident that there is a strong 
enough case to overrule the community’s preferences in favor of the traditional consumption 
metric of poverty, especially given the gain in satisfaction and legitimacy. On the other hand, 
what is clear is that based on our evidence, there is no case for the intermediate hybrid method: it 
resulted in both poor targeting performance and low legitimacy. This may be because its main 
theoretical advantage—preventing elite capture—was not important in our setting. It is possible 
that perhaps alternative hybrid designs that allow the community to add some very poor 
households to the PMT might perform better than those that limit the universe to the PMT 
surveys, as the community does better at identifying those under PPP$1 per day.  
  The findings in this paper raise several interesting questions for further research. First, 
while we found little evidence of elite capture or general malfeasance of the targeting methods, it 
is possible that this might change over time as individuals learn to better manipulate the system. 
Manipulation over time has been shown to occur in some kinds of PMT systems (Camacho and 
Conover, 2008), but whether it would occur when the per-village allocation is fixed, and whether 
it would be more or less severe in community-targeted systems, are important open questions. 
Second, given how well the community outcomes match individual self-assessments, an 
important question is whether some form of self-targeting system (perhaps connected to an 
ordeal mechanism as in Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982)) could provide a more cost-effective 
method of targeting the poor. We regard these as important questions for future research. 
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Table 1: Randomization Design 
 
Community/Hybrid Sub-Treatments  Main Treatments
Community Hybrid PMT 
Elite 
10 Poorest First  Day 24 23
 
Night 26 32




10 Poorest First  Day 29 28
Night 29 23
No 10 Poorest First  Day 28 33
Night 20 24
TOTAL 214 217 209 
Notes: This table shows the results of the randomization. Each cell reports the number of sub-villages randomized to each combination of treatments. 
Note that the randomization of sub-villages into main treatments was stratified to be balanced in each of 51 strata. The randomization of community 
and hybrid subvillages into each sub-treatment (elite or full community, 10 poorest prompting or no 10 poorest prompting, and day or night) was 






Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
   
Variable  Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Panel A: Consumption from baseline survey   
Per capita consumption (Rp. 000s)  5753 557.501  602.33 
   
Panel B: Mis-targeting variables:   
On beneficiary list  5756 0.32 0.46 
Mis-target  5753 0.32 0.47 
Mis-target -- nonpoor (rich + middle)  3725 0.20 0.40 
Mis-target -- poor (near + very poor)  2028 0.53 0.50 
Mis-target -- rich  1843 0.14 0.35 
Mis-target -- middle income  1882 0.27 0.44 
Mis-target -- near poor  1074 0.59 0.49 
Mis-target -- very poor  954 0.46 0.50 
   
Panel C: Rank correlations between treatment results and…  
Per capita consumption  640 0.41 0.34 
Community (excluding sub-village head)  640 0.64 0.33 
Sub-village Head  640 0.58 0.41 
Self-Assessment  637 0.40 0.34 




Table 3: Testing Balance Between Treatment Groups 
 
  Means    Differences, No Fixed Effects   
Differences, Controlling for Stratum 
Fixed Effects 













   (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9) 
Average per capita expenditure (Rp. 000s)  558.576  550.579  564.295    -7.997  5.719  13.716    -1.331  11.980  13.312 
  [245.845]  [220.237]  [337.172]    (22.728)  (28.535)  (27.416)    (20.661)  (25.973)  (24.913) 
Average years of education of household   7.360  7.566  7.087    0.206  -0.273  -0.4785*    0.219  -0.255  -0.4739** 
head among survey respondents   [2.616]  [2.644]  [2.627]    (0.256)  (0.254)  (0.254)    (0.204)  (0.200)  (0.209) 
PMT score   12.467  12.519  12.474    0.052  0.007  -0.045    0.053  0.011  -0.043 
(calculated from Baseline survey)  [0.436]  [0.414]  [0.423]    (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.040)    (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037) 
Pct. of households that are agricultural  45.827  42.887  48.438    -2.940  2.612  5.5515*    -3.7806*  1.264  5.0442** 
  [34.889]  [33.789]  [35.038]    (3.343)  (3.391)  (3.318)    (2.060)  (2.096)  (2.027) 
Years of education of RT head  8.856  8.860  8.604    0.003  -0.253  -0.256    0.033  -0.206  -0.238 
  [4.018]  [4.244]  [3.796]    (0.402)  (0.379)  (0.388)    (0.352)  (0.336)  (0.335) 
Log number of households  3.832  3.895  3.810    0.063  -0.022  -0.0853*    0.057  -0.028  -0.0846** 
  [0.491]  [0.489]  [0.460]    (0.048)  (0.046)  (0.046)    (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.041) 
Distance to kecamatan in km  0.444  0.416  0.482    -0.028  0.039  0.067    -0.029  0.038  0.0673* 
  [0.652]  [0.473]  [0.431]    (0.056)  (0.054)  (0.044)    (0.050)  (0.046)  (0.037) 
Log size of villages in hectares  3.105  3.271  3.282    0.166  0.177  0.011    0.1435*  0.1376*  -0.006 
  [1.278]  [1.197]  [1.187]    (0.121)  (0.120)  (0.115)    (0.075)  (0.075)  (0.076) 
Religious building per household  0.0070  0.0060  0.0060    -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0001    -0.0004  -0.0005  -0.0001 
  [0.0050]  [0.0050]  [0.0050]    (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)    (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0003) 
Primary school per household  0.0030  0.0030  0.0030    0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0003    0.0000  -0.0002  -0.0003 
  [0.0030]  [0.0030]  [0.0020]    (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)    (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
                       
P-value from joint test          0.275   0.689   0.089     0.165   0.322   0.028  
                       
Notes: An observation is a sub-village, and therefore, there are 640 observations.  Standard deviations are shown in brackets in columns (1) – (3); robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses in columns (4) – (9). 42 
 
 
Table 4: Results of Different Targeting Methods on Mis-targeting Rate           
 
   




By Income Status By Detailed Income Status Per-capita 
consumption of 
beneficiaries 
Sample:  Non-poor Poor Rich Middle 
income 
Near Poor Very Poor
Community treatment  0.031*  0.046** 0.022 0.028 0.067** 0.49 -0.013 9.933 
  (0.017)  (0.018) (0.028) (0.021) (0.027) (0.038) (0.039) (18.742) 
Hybrid treatment  0.029*  0.037** 0.009 0.020 0.052** 0.031 -0.008 -1.155 
  (0.016)  (0.017) (0.027) (0.020) (0.025) (0.037) (0.037) (19.302) 
Observations      5753     3725    2028    1843     1882    1074    954    1719
Mean in PMT treatment  0.30  0.18 0.52 0.13 0.23 0.55 0.48    366
   
Notes: All regressions include stratum fixed effects. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the village level. All coefficients are interpretable relative to the 
PMT treatment, which is the omitted category. The mean of the dependent variable in the PMT treatment is shown in the bottom row. All specifications include stratum fixed effects. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 43 
 
 
Table 5: Satisfaction  
   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) 
Panel A: Household Endline Survey 
  Is the method applied to 
determine the targeted 
households appropriate? 
(1=worst,4=best) 
Are you satisfied with 
P2K08 activities in this 
sub-village in general? 
(1=worst,4=best) 
Are there any poor HH 
which should be added 
to the list? 
(0=no, 1 = yes) 
 
Number of HH that 
should be added from 
list 
 
Number of HH that 






Community treatment  0.161*** 0.245*** -0.189*** -0.578*** -0.554*** <0.001 
  (0.056) (0.049) (0.040) (0.158) (0.112)
Hybrid treatment  0.018 0.063 0.020 0.078 -0.171 0.762 
  (0.055) (0.049) (0.042) (0.188) (0.129)
Observations        1089       1214      1435       1435      1435
Mean in PMT treatment  3.243 3.042 0.568 1.458 0.968
   
Panel B: Sub-village Head Endline Survey 
  Is the method applied to 
determine the targeted 
households appropriate? 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
In your opinion, are 
villagers satisfied with 
P2K08 activities in this 
sub-village in general? 
(1=worst,4=best) 
Are there any poor HH 
which should be added 
to the list? 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
 
Are there any poor HH 
which should be 
subtracted from the list? 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
 
Community treatment  0.378*** 0.943*** -0.169*** -0.010 <0.001 
  (0.038) (0.072) (0.045) (0.020)
Hybrid treatment  0.190*** 0.528*** -0.065 -0.019 <0.001 
  (0.038) (0.071) (0.043) (0.019)
Observations        636       629      640       640
Mean in PMT treatment  0.565 2.456 0.732 0.057
   
Panel C: Comment forms and fund disbursement results
  Number of comments in 
the comment box 
Number of complaints in 
the comment box 
Number of complaints 
received by sub-village 
head 
 
Did facilitator encounter 
any difficulty in 
distributing the funds? 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
Fund distributed in a 
meeting 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
Community treatment  -0.944 -1.085*** -2.684*** -0.062*** 0.082** 0.0014 
  (0.822) (0.286) (0.530) (0.023) (0.038) 0.177 
Hybrid treatment  -0.364 -0.554** -2.010*** -0.045* 0.051
  (0.821) (0.285) (0.529) (0.026) (0.038)
Observations        640       640      640       621      614
Mean in PMT treatment        11.392  1.694 4.34 0.135 0.579
Notes: All estimation is by OLS with stratum fixed effects.  Using ordered probit for multiple response and probit models for binary dependent variables produces the same signs and statistical 
significance as the results shown.   These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 6: Elite Treatments 
   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  Attendance (Meeting Data) Attendance (Survey Data) Mis-target Dummy
Community treatment   0.367*** 0.360***  0.029 0.044**
   (0.038) (0.044) (0.018) (0.020)
Hybrid treatment  0.021 0.019 0.370*** 0.378***  0.027 0.013
  (0.029) (0.036) (0.037) (0.043) (0.018) (0.020)
Elite sub-treatment  -0.062** -0.064 -0.301*** -0.287***  0.004 -0.025
  (0.029) (0.041) (0.034) (0.050) (0.016) (0.023)
Elite × hybrid   0.004 -0.029 0.058*
   (0.058) (0.068) (0.032)
Observations     431      431     287     287      5753     5753
Mean in PMT treatment     N/A      N/A 0.11 0.11 0.30 0.30
   
Notes: In columns (1) – (4), an observation is a village. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the number of households attending the meeting (as observed on the meeting 
attendance list) divided by the number of households in the village. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the share of households surveyed in the endline survey where at least 1 
household member attended a targeting meeting. The PMT mean in columns (3) and (4) is not zero, because the question was worded generically to be about any targeting meeting, not just 
meetings associated with our project. The dependent variable in column (5) and (6) is the mis-targeting dummy, as in column (1) of Table 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses, and standard 




Table 7: Are Households Connected to Elites Treated Differently? 
   
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
  Mis-target dummy On beneficiary list dummy
Elite connectedness  -0.025 -0.025 -0.063*** -0.063***
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Elite connectedness  -0.015 -0.013 -0.067** -0.078**
× community treatment  (0.035) (0.038) (0.033) (0.036) 
Elite connectedness  0.010 0.010 -0.013 -0.001 
× hybrid treatment  (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) 
Elite connectedness  -0.029 -0.034 0.041 0.064 
× elite treatment  (0.031) (0.047) (0.030) (0.042) 
Elite connectedness  0.003 -0.047 
× elite treatment × hybrid  (0.063) (0.060) 
Observations       5753      5753      5756      5756 
   
Notes: All specifications include dummies for the community, hybrid, and elite treatment main effects, as well as stratum fixed effects; 
columns (2) and (4) also include a dummy for elite × hybrid. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the village 
level. Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the mis-target dummy for the full sample, as in column (1) of Table 4. Dependent variable 
in columns (3) and (4) is a dummy for being a beneficiary of the program. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 45 
 
 
Table 8: Effort 
   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  Mis-target dummy On beneficiary list dummy
Household order in ranking  0.030 0.059 0.049* 0.048*
(percentile)  (0.026) (0.037) (0.026) (0.029)
Household order in ranking    -0.056 0.001
× hybrid   (0.052) (0.028)
Poorest 10 framing sub-treament   -0.006 -0.007
   (0.016) (0.023)
Poorest 10 framing sub-treatment    0.002
× hybrid   (0.031)
Observations       3784     3784     3874       3874    3785     3785
   
Notes: All specifications are limited to community and hybrid villages. Columns (1) – (4) include a hybrid dummy and stratum fixed effects; columns (5) and (6) include 
stratum fixed effects since the total number of beneficiaries is constant in all treatments. The dependent variable in columns (1) – (4) is the mis-target dummy for the full 
sample, as in column (1) of Table 4. The dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) is a dummy for being chosen as a recipient, as in column (3) of Table 6.*** p<0.01, ** 






Table 9: Rank correlation matrix of alternative welfare metrics 
   









Consumption (rg)  1.000
Community survey ranks (rc)  0.376 1.000
Sub-village head survey ranks(re)  0.334 0.737 1.000
Self-Assessment(rs)  0.263 0.445 0.407 1.000
   






Table 10: Assessing targeting treatments using alternative welfare metrics 
   









Community treatment  -0.065** 0.246*** 0.248*** 0.102***
  (0.033) (0.029) (0.038) (0.033)
Hybrid treatment  -0.067** 0.143*** 0.128*** 0.075**
  (0.033) (0.029) (0.038) (0.033)
Observations        640       640      640       637
Mean in PMT treatment  0.451 0.506 0.456 0.343
   
Notes: The dependent variable is the rank correlation between the treatment outcome (i.e., the rank ordering of households generated by the 
PMT, community, or hybrid treatment) and the welfare metric shown in the column, where each observation is a village. Robust standard 




Table 11: Do community meetings reflect broadly  shared  preferences?          
       
   (1)  (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8)





















Community treatment    0.349*** 0.027   -0.089** 0.232*** 0.180*** 0.072
    (0.042) (0.021)   (0.045) (0.040) (0.052) (0.044)
Hybrid treatment  0.020  0.353*** 0.008 0.026   -0.089** 0.130*** 0.064 0.046
  (0.029)  (0.041) (0.017) (0.021)   (0.044) (0.039) (0.051) (0.044)
Day meeting treatment  -0.021  0.013 0.104*** 0.008   0.019 0.004 0.055 0.014
  (0.029)  (0.033) (0.017) (0.016)   (0.033) (0.029) (0.038) (0.033)
Elite treatment  -0.064**  -0.300*** -0.085*** 0.005   -0.004 -0.023 0.034 -0.017
  (0.029)  (0.033) (0.017) (0.016)   (0.033) (0.029) (0.038) (0.033)
10 Poorest treatment  0.022  0.023 -0.010 -0.006   0.031 0.047 0.044 0.062*
  (0.029)  (0.034) (0.018) (0.016)   (0.033) (0.029) (0.038) (0.032)
Observations        431        287       428      5753          640      640      640      637
Mean in PMT treatment    0.110 0.300   0.451 0.506 0.456 0.343
       
Notes: For column (3), the dependent variable is the percentage of households in the village in which a female attends the meeting, using data collected from the meeting attendance lists. *** 






Table 12: Information 
   
  Survey rank Survey rank  Survey  rank
   (1) (2)  (2  continued)
Rank per capita consumption within   0.132*** 0.088***
village in percentiles  (0.014) (0.012)
Rank per capita consumption from   0.368***
PMT within village in percentiles  (0.014)
Household floor area per capita    0.001*** Has this Household ever got   0.027**
    0.000 credit? (0.011)
Not earth floor    0.060*** Number of children 0-4  0.000
    (0.010) (0.006)
Brick or cement wall    0.065*** Number of Children in   0.003
    (0.007) Elementary School  (0.005)
Private toilet    0.047*** Number of Children in Junior   0.007
    (0.008) High School (0.007)
Clean drinking water    0.008 Number of Children in Senior   0.022***
    (0.009) High School (0.008)
PLN electricity    0.064*** Highest Education Attainment   0.007
    (0.008) within HH is Elem. School  (0.016)
Concrete or corrugated roof    0.027* Highest Education Attainment   0.01
    (0.014) within HH is Junior School  (0.016)
Cooks with firewood    0.031*** Highest Education Attainment   0.051***
    (0.008) within HH is Senior High or higher (0.017)
Own house privately    0.034*** Total Dependency Ratio  0.004
    (0.008) (0.006)
Household size    0.004 AC 0.049**
    (0.006) (0.023)
Household Size Squared    -0.001 Computer 0.045***
    (0.001) (0.011)
Age of head of household    0.011*** Radio / Cassette Player 0.001
    (0.002) (0.006)
Age of head of household squared    -0.000*** TV 0.043***
    0.000 (0.010)
Head of household is Male    0.047** DVD/VCD player 0.017**
    (0.019) (0.007)
Head of household is married    0.119*** Satellite dish 0.021*
    (0.022) (0.011)
Head of household is male and     -0.043* Gas burner 0.030***
Married    (0.026) (0.008)
Head of household works in     -0.006 Refrigerator 0.069***
agriculture sector    (0.041) (0.008)
Head of household works in industry     -0.043 Bicycle -0.004
Sector    (0.042) (0.007)
Head of household works in service     -0.018 Motorcycle 0.078***
Sector    (0.042) (0.007)
Head of household works in     0.071 Car / Mini-bus / Truck 0.116***
formal sector    (0.045) (0.012)
Head of household works in     0.048 HP 0.014*
informal sector    (0.045) (0.007)
Education Attainment of HH     0.008 Jewelry 0.034***
Head is Elementary School    (0.008) (0.006)
Education Attainment of HH     0.036*** Chicken -0.001
Head is Junior School     (0.010) (0.006)
Education Attainment of HH     0.041*** Caribou / Cow 0.065***
Head is Senior High School or higher    (0.011) (0.012)
Observations        40398      38336





Table 13: What is the community maximizing? 
 

















   (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Log PCE  0.176***  0.145*** 0.087*** 0.132*** 0.197***  0.162***
  (0.008)  (0.008) (0.004) (0.013) (0.014)  (0.014)
Log HH size  0.164***  0.134*** 0.073*** -0.028 0.154***  0.078***
  (0.011)  (0.010) (0.006) (0.019) (0.019)  (0.021)
Share kids  -0.125***  -0.094*** -0.037*** -0.296*** -0.068*  -0.141***
  (0.021)  (0.021) (0.012) (0.035) (0.041)  (0.039)
HH head with primary  -0.028***  -0.025*** -0.037*** -0.108*** -0.011  -0.066***
education or less  (0.009)  (0.009) (0.005) (0.017) (0.018)  (0.017)
Elite connected  0.092***  0.044*** 0.025*** 0.062*** 0.051***  0.043***
  (0.008)  (0.009) (0.005) (0.016) (0.015)  (0.015)
Ethnic minority  -0.024*  -0.019 -0.003 0.012 -0.051**  -0.011
  (0.014)  (0.014) (0.008) (0.026) (0.025)  (0.024)
Religious minority  0.012  -0.007 -0.014* -0.018 0.025  0.012
  (0.018)  (0.017) (0.008) (0.030) (0.032)  (0.033)
Widow  -0.104***  -0.083*** -0.012 0.009 -0.108***  -0.026
  (0.014)  (0.014) (0.008) (0.027) (0.024)  (0.028)
Disability  -0.045***  -0.037*** -0.026*** -0.079*** 0.009  0.012
  (0.016)  (0.014) (0.008) (0.027) (0.026)  (0.027)
Death  -0.041*  -0.031 -0.010 -0.111*** -0.013  -0.059
  (0.025)  (0.025) (0.015) (0.042) (0.048)  (0.043)
Sick  -0.038***  -0.041*** -0.028*** 0.007 -0.018  -0.044**
  (0.011)  (0.011) (0.006) (0.018) (0.019)  (0.019)
Recent shock to   -0.001  -0.005 -0.013** -0.019 0.009  -0.012
income  (0.009)  (0.009) (0.005) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.017)
Tobacco and alcohol  -0.0002***  -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0002***  -0.0001***
consumption  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)
Total savings  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)
Share of savings in a  0.096***  0.069*** 0.052*** 0.121*** 0.103***  0.075***
bank  (0.011)  (0.010) (0.006) (0.018) (0.021)  (0.020)
Share of debt  0.005***  0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002 0.007***  0.008***
  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.001)
Connectedness  -0.039***  -0.021** -0.015*** -0.016 -0.019  -0.054***
  (0.010)  (0.009) (0.005) (0.017) (0.017)  (0.019)
Number of family members   0.012***  0.010*** 0.006*** 0.020*** 0.001  0.001
outside sub-village  (0.004)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006)
Participation in religious  0.027***  0.033*** 0.014** 0.033** 0.012  0.029
groups  (0.010)  (0.010) (0.006) (0.016) (0.017)  (0.017)
Participation through work to  0.002  0.021** 0.005 0.000 0.010  0.003
community projects  (0.011)  (0.010) (0.006) (0.018) (0.019)  (0.019)
Participation through money  0.061***  0.041*** 0.024*** 0.056*** 0.058***  0.034*
to community projects   (0.009)  (0.009) (0.005) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.018)
Observations  5337  4680 5724 1814 1876  1889
     
Notes: Note that the children and household head education variables are explicitly included in the PMT regression (see Table 12). The PMT 
regression also includes dummies for the household head being male, married, and male * married, which together will be closely correlated 
with the widow variable.  49 
 






























Notes: The left panel shows the PDF of log per-capita consumption for those households chosen to receive the transfer, separately by each treatment. 
The right panel shows the PDF of log per-capita consumption for those households not chosen to receive the transfer, separately by treatment. The 
vertical lines show the PPP$1 and PPP$2 per day poverty lines (see footnote for more information on the calculation of these poverty lines.) 
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Notes: This figure graphs the relationship between mis-targeting and the randomized rank order from a non-parametric Fan regression.  The dashed 
lines represent cluster-bootstrapped 95
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lingga Wonogiri Demak  Kendal  Semarang Bone  Enrekang 
Tana 
Toraja Makasar 
I n d i c a t o r s      
Type of place     -0.086 -0.077 -0.068 -0.095 -0.230 0.112
(1=Urban 0=Others)    (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.020) (0.017) (0.031)
Percapita Floor     0.004 0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 
     (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Type of Floor   -0.100  0.113 0.149 0.118 0.133 0.111 0.096 0.169 -0.108 0.088 
(1=Not earth 0=Others)  (0.024)  (0.026) (0.031) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.027) (0.021) (0.028) 
Type of Wall   0.104    0.053 0.055 0.033 0.119 0.059 0.114
(1=Brick/Cement 0=Others)  (0.027)    (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.026) (0.028) (0.038)
Toilet Facility   0.056  0.094 0.184 0.127 0.066 0.094 0.123 0.073 0.103 0.033 0.087 0.140 
(1=Private 0=Others)  (0.015)  (0.022) (0.034) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.020) (0.017) (0.014) (0.019) (0.022) 
Drinking Water source   0.035    0.112 0.044 0.064 0.100 -0.047 0.100 0.028 0.117 
(1=Clean 0=Other)  (0.014)    (0.036) (0.017) (0.014) (0.019) (0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.020) 
Electricity (1=PLN 0=Others)    0.113 0.294 0.112 0.177 0.125 0.286 0.286 0.190 0.093
   (0.033) (0.074) (0.034) (0.077) (0.043) (0.081) (0.123) (0.021) (0.021)
Type of Roof   0.078  0.085 0.108 -0.208 -0.121 -0.037 -0.075 0.178 0.093 0.095 0.122 
(1=Concrete/Corrugated 0=Others)  (0.034)  (0.042) (0.046) (0.021) (0.024) (0.018) (0.021) (0.057) (0.032) (0.053) (0.028) 
Fuel for Cooking   0.178  0.155 0.274 0.188 0.172 0.155 0.168 0.152 0.229 0.145 0.074 0.188 
(1=Not Firewood 0=Other)  (0.033)  (0.021) (0.019) (0.027) (0.038) (0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.030) (0.021) (0.036) (0.018) 
Ownership of house   0.060    0.080 0.076 0.102 0.077 0.087 
(1=Private 0=Others)  (0.021)    (0.042) (0.035) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) 
Having Micro Credit   0.129 0.098 0.165 0.209 0.069 -0.106 0.045 0.227 0.304 
   (0.073) (0.036) (0.050) (0.045) (0.023) (0.049) (0.022) (0.060) (0.111) 
Household Size  -0.287  -0.247 -0.261 -0.314 -0.330 -0.254 -0.277 -0.378 -0.249 -0.250 -0.209 -0.293 
 (0.018)  (0.033) (0.026) (0.025) (0.021) (0.027) (0.025) (0.021) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) 
Household Size Squared  0.017  0.012 0.014 0.019 0.021 0.014 0.016 0.026 0.014 0.015 0.012 0.016 
 (0.001)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age of the head of household 0.010  0.013 0.004 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.007 0.004 0.007 
 (0.004)  (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) 
Age of the head of household 
Squared  0.000 0.000    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Head of household gender 0.153  0.193 0.109 0.092 0.098 0.171 0.153 0.070 0.145 0.101 0.135 
(1=Male 0=Female)  (0.037)  (0.073) (0.057) (0.026) (0.037) (0.049) (0.040) (0.024) (0.029) (0.038) (0.036) 
Head of household is Married  0.166    -0.066 -0.086   0.119 
 (0.083)    (0.034) (0.050)   (0.068) 
Head of household is Male*Married  -0.207  -0.141 -0.074 -0.060 -0.075 -0.230 
 (0.089)  (0.071) (0.038) (0.026) (0.035) (0.076) 
Sector of HH Head is Agriculture    -0.066 -0.071   -0.080 -0.138 
   (0.021) (0.022)   (0.021) (0.058) 
Sector of HH Head is Industry  0.240    -0.060 0.105   -0.121 -0.108 -0.101 -0.110 
  (0.073)   (0.029) (0.020)  (0.019) (0.031) (0.044) (0.036) 
Sector of HH Head is Service  0.248    0.145 0.098 0.107 0.053 0.089 -0.065 
 (0.028)    (0.021) (0.027) (0.020) (0.019) (0.026) (0.027) 
Sector of HH Head is in Formal       0.082 0.036 0.076 0.058 0.056 0.083 0.089 0.040 
Sector     (0.023) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.020) 
Sector of HH Head is in Informal   0.045    0.045   0.077 0.051 0.140
Sector (0.024)    (0.023)   (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Education Attaintment of HH Head   0.053  0.152 0.031 0.061 0.183 0.041 0.115 0.053 0.063
is Elementary School  (0.023)  (0.040) (0.028) (0.025) (0.035) (0.018) (0.028) (0.019) (0.032)
Education Attaintment of HH Head   0.072  0.164 0.198 0.166 0.153 0.164 0.128 0.204 0.099 0.081 0.080 0.156 
is Junior School  (0.027)  (0.040) (0.031) (0.032) (0.028) (0.036) (0.026) (0.054) (0.030) (0.016) (0.031) (0.035) 
Education Attaintment of HH Head   0.096  0.194 0.143 0.140 0.113 0.088 0.198 0.317 0.099 0.129 0.170 0.196 51 
 
is Senior +  (0.033)  (0.045) (0.032) (0.051) (0.036) (0.045) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) (0.020) (0.036) (0.053) 
Number of children 0-4  -0.043      -0.078 -0.029 -0.044 -0.028 
 (0.011)      (0.017) (0.013) (0.010) (0.016) 
Number of Children in Elementary        
School      
Number of Children in Junior     0.056 0.056 0.086 0.072 0.045 0.073
H.School   (0.022) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020)
Number of Children in Senior     0.076 0.069 0.165 0.150 0.135 0.116 0.167 0.029 0.049 0.109 
H.School   (0.023) (0.017) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.012) 
Highest Education Attaintment of   0.053  0.152 0.061 -0.045 0.105 0.133 0.064 0.063 0.077 
HH Members is Elementary School  (0.023)  (0.040) (0.025) (0.019) (0.028) (0.054) (0.026) (0.032) (0.031) 
Highest Education Attaintment of   0.077  0.058 0.113 0.122 0.153 0.164 0.070 0.221 0.120 0.081 0.050 0.170 
HH Members is Junior School  (0.025)  (0.032) (0.083) (0.034) (0.028) (0.036) (0.030) (0.032) (0.035) (0.016) (0.024) (0.051) 
Highest Education Attaintment of   0.110  0.135 0.211 0.317 0.267 0.281 0.133 0.310 0.170 0.129 0.109 0.231 
HH Members is Senior +  (0.033)  (0.044) (0.082) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043) (0.035) (0.054) (0.041) (0.020) (0.032) (0.039) 
Dependency Ratio    -0.039 -0.034 -0.027 -0.075   -0.034 -0.022 -0.040 -0.074 
   (0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017)   (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018) 
Distance to District     -0.004 -0.025 -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 
   (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Existence of SD    -0.224 0.183   -1.438 0.093
   (0.040) (0.102)   (0.057) (0.041)
Existence of SLTP  -0.150    -0.051 -0.088 0.041   0.053
 (0.019)    (0.028) (0.020) (0.017)   (0.016)
Existence of Puskesmas/Pustu  -0.047  -0.116 0.100 0.032   0.049 0.038 
 (0.020)  (0.024) (0.031) (0.017)   (0.020) (0.019) 
Existence of Polindes  -0.054  -0.114 -0.048   0.029
 (0.017)  (0.028) (0.016)   (0.015)
Existence of Posyandu -0.062  -0.081 -0.184   0.174 -0.205
 (0.018)  (0.040) (0.073)   (0.038) (0.038)
Availability of Doctor     -0.050 -0.080 0.092 0.085 
     (0.021) (0.018) (0.023) (0.025) 
Availability of Bidan  0.082  0.089 -0.144 -0.065 0.072 0.093 -0.068 0.084 
 (0.025)  (0.035) (0.068) (0.027) (0.036) (0.034) (0.021) (0.025) 
Road type is Asphalt 0.101  0.132 -0.280 0.137 -0.042 0.053   -0.114 0.057 -0.247 
 (0.015)  (0.023) (0.057) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)   (0.018) (0.015) (0.066) 
Existence of Semi permanent market       0.276 0.049 0.065 -0.090 -0.099 0.048 
place     (0.098) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.034) (0.021) 
Existence of Credit Facility    0.055  -0.072 -0.040 -0.031 -0.185
   (0.022)   (0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.022)
Constant 12.839  12.884 12.131 12.119 13.287 12.756 12.344 14.008 12.577 12.852 13.082 13.098 
 (0.106)  (0.150) (0.218) (0.123) (0.127) (0.076) (0.131) (0.149) (0.109) (0.082) (0.087) (0.118) 
Observations      1920      2239    1824    2112    2208    2208     2208    2496    2016    1824    1920    2208 
R-squared  0.606    0.284 0.486 0.457 0.436 0.363 0.471 0.516 0.474 0.556 0.478 0.583   
      
Notes: Each column reports the result from a separate regression for that district. The dependent variable is log per capita consumption. Following standard BPS procedure, for each district, a 
first regression was run with all variables listed. A second regression was then run retaining only those variables that were statistically significant at the 10% level in the first regression. The 
results above present the results of this second regression, which were used for the PMT calculation. All variables above are statistically significant at least at the 10% level. 52 
 
Appendix Table 2: Results of Different Targeting Methods on Mis-targeting Rate - Time elapsed between survey and targeting 
 
      




  By Income Status By Detailed Income Status Per-capita 
consumption of 
beneficiaries 
Sample:   Non-poor Poor Rich Middle 
income 
Near Poor Very Poor
Community treatment  0.088   0.098 0.042 0.090 0.102 0.127 -0.072 68.008 
  (0.072)   (0.074) (0.129) (0.086) (0.111) (0.170) (0.178) (78.501) 
Hybrid treatment  0.018   0.074 -0.226* 0.023 0.117 -0.252 -0.227 5.139
  (0.072)   (0.071) (0.125) (0.081) (0.108) (0.166) (0.176) (90.750) 
Time elapsed  0.000   -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.004 -0.002 0.759
  (0.001)   (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (1.552) 
Time elapsed x  -0.001   -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 -1.358
Community Treatment  (0.002)   (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (1.852) 
Time elapsed x  0.000   -0.001 0.005 0.000 -0.001 0.005 0.005 -0.322
Hybrid Treatment  (0.002)   (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (2.049) 
Observations          5595            3617        1978        1791         1826        1052        926        1687
Mean in PMT treatment           0.30              0.18         0.52         0.13          0.23         0.55         0.48         366
      
Notes: All regressions include stratum fixed effects. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the village level. All coefficients are interpretable relative to the 
PMT treatment, which is the omitted category. The mean of the dependent variable in the PMT treatment is shown in the bottom row. All specifications include stratum fixed effects. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 53 
 
Appendix Table 3: Results of Different Targeting Methods on Mis-targeting Rate - Heterogeneity 
 
      




  By Income Status By Detailed Income Status Per-capita 
consumption of 
beneficiaries 
Sample:   Non-poor Poor Rich Middle 
income 
Near Poor Very Poor
Community treatment  0.069**  0.005 0.145** -0.052 0.068 0.218*** 0.042 -44.804 
  (0.035)   (0.039) (0.058) (0.050) (0.053) (0.079) (0.083) (36.192) 
Hybrid treatment  0.087**  0.017 0.130** 0.041 -0.009 0.200** 0.092 -22.408 
  (0.037)   (0.042) (0.060) (0.054) (0.054) (0.078) (0.087) (40.155) 
Urban village  -0.010   -0.098*** 0.128*** -0.088** -0.113** 0.231*** 0.035 -20.668 
  (0.030)   (0.035) (0.046) (0.043) (0.047) (0.063) (0.062) (36.623) 
Inequality  -0.004   -0.026 0.057 -0.029 -0.015 0.043 0.091* -3.963
  (0.026)   (0.027) (0.040) (0.033) (0.039) (0.055) (0.053) (33.960) 
General  0.043*   -0.010 0.000 0.009 -0.046 0.036 -0.043 -20.957 
Connectedness  (0.026)   (0.031) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.053) (0.056) (29.451) 
Urban village x   -0.049   0.026 -0.110* 0.056 -0.029 -0.184** -0.041 25.062 
Community treatment  (0.036)   (0.039) (0.060) (0.045) (0.058) (0.078) (0.083) (41.936) 
Urban village x   -0.051   0.014 -0.069 -0.001 0.020 -0.149* -0.015 11.794 
Hybrid treatment  (0.036)   (0.039) (0.059) (0.045) (0.055) (0.079) (0.082) (47.509) 
Inequality x  -0.016   0.022 -0.134** 0.027 0.052 -0.128* -0.117 38.764 
Community treatment  (0.035)   (0.039) (0.055) (0.047) (0.057) (0.075) (0.076) (39.728) 
Inequality x  -0.021   -0.002 -0.069 -0.036 0.061 0.006 -0.157** 13.022 
Hybrid treatment  (0.034)   (0.037) (0.054) (0.045) (0.054) (0.073) (0.077) (41.603) 
General Connectedness x  -0.018   0.022 -0.007 0.069 -0.025 -0.038 0.040 44.665 
Community treatment  (0.035)   (0.041) (0.058) (0.050) (0.056) (0.078) (0.082) (39.438) 
General Connectedness x  -0.050   0.018 -0.081 -0.007 0.034 -0.166** -0.010 17.931 
Hybrid treatment  (0.035)   (0.040) (0.058) (0.050) (0.052) (0.080) (0.078) (40.290) 
Observations          5753            3725        2028        1843         1882        1074        954        1719
Mean in PMT treatment           0.30              0.18         0.52         0.13          0.23         0.55         0.48         366
      
Notes: All regressions include stratum fixed effects. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the village level. All coefficients are interpretable relative to the 
PMT treatment, which is the omitted category. The mean of the dependent variable in the PMT treatment is shown in the bottom row. All specifications include stratum fixed effects. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 54 
 
 
Appendix Table 4: Are elite results driven by social connections? 
 
   
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)
  Mis-target dummy On beneficiary list dummy  Mis-target dummy
Elite connectedness  -0.034 -0.034 -0.078*** -0.078***  0.083** -0.074***
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.040) (0.023)
Connectedness  0.041* 0.041* 0.067*** 0.067***  -0.051 0.049**
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.041) (0.024)
Elite connectedness  -0.010 -0.002 -0.064* -0.075**  0.068 -0.035
× community treatment  (0.035) (0.039) (0.034) (0.037) (0.064) (0.036)
Elite connectedness  0.003 -0.004 -0.022 -0.010  0.035 0.018
× hybrid treatment  (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.062) (0.036)
Elite connectedness  -0.032 -0.050 0.040 0.062  -0.067 0.018
× elite treatment  (0.031) (0.047) (0.031) (0.043) (0.059) (0.032)
Elite connectedness   0.030 -0.050 
× elite treatment × hybrid   (0.064) (0.061) 
Connectedness  -0.002 -0.026 0.008 0.019  0.004 0.010
× community treatment  (0.038) (0.043) (0.036) (0.041) (0.066) (0.041)
Connectedness ×   0.041 0.064 0.055 0.042  -0.041 0.043
hybrid treatment  (0.037) (0.041) (0.035) (0.037) (0.073) (0.036)
Connectedness ×  -0.000 0.043 -0.004 -0.029  -0.044 -0.004
elite treatment  (0.035) (0.051) (0.032) (0.047) (0.067) (0.035)
Connectedness × elite treatment ×   -0.090 0.050 
hybrid treatment   (0.071) (0.065) 
Observations         5753           5753           5756           5756             2028            3725
   
Notes: All specifications include dummies for the community, hybrid, and elite treatment main effects, as well as stratum fixed effects; 
columns (2) and (4) also include a dummy for elite × hybrid. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the village 
level. Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the mis-target dummy for the full sample, as in column (1) of Table 4. Dependent variable 
in columns (3) and (4) is a dummy for being a beneficiary of the program. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 